GHSA-m6c8-jcw2-5r25: XSS

Summary

The Opencast Paella player renders caption cue text into innerHTML without escaping. The captions canvas clears captionsContainer.innerHTML and then appends each active cue with captionsContainer.innerHTML += cue, so HTML inside a WebVTT or DFXP cue becomes live DOM and executes in the Opencast origin.

The caption track is read from any media package element with a captions/ flavor and is served, with the player manifest, to anonymous viewers through /search/episode.json. The caption plugins that consume it are enabled in the default player configuration, the "Subtitles" upload that produces a captions/source track is active by default, and no caption processing step escapes the cue text.

A user who can upload a subtitle to an event and publish it stores the payload in the published caption file. Any viewer who opens the event and turns captions on runs the script.

Result: a non-admin content author stores JavaScript in a subtitle cue that executes in the browser session of every viewer who enables captions on that event, including anonymous viewers and authenticated staff.

Affected

opencast/opencast, engage-paella-player module. Supported release lines 19.x and 20.x are affected (and 18.x). Live-confirmed on 18.8 (Paella 7, paella-core 1.50.2) and 20.0 (Paella 8, paella-core 1.50.4); 19.5 ships the code-identical caption path (paella-core 1.50.4, same EpisodeConversor and default plugin config as 20.0). The captions canvas uses the same innerHTML += cue sink across these versions. Default configuration: the WebVTT and DFXP caption plugins are enabled: true in etc/ui-config/mhdefaultorg/paella7/config.json, the "Subtitles" upload option (captions/source, .vtt) is active in etc/listproviders/event.upload.asset.options.properties, and the fast workflow publishes captions/ to the engage player. Condition: an event with a caption track published to the engage player. No non-default flag required.

Root cause

The captions canvas appends each cue to captionsContainer.innerHTML in the bundled paella-core (served at /paellaN/ui/paella-player.js / the 20.x core chunk), so markup in a cue becomes live DOM. The caption entry is built from any media package element whose flavor matches captions/ at modules/engage-paella-player-7/src/js/EpisodeConversor.js:392, and /search/episode.json serves the manifest and the caption file to anonymous clients. The WebVTT and DFXP plugins that consume it are enabled by default at etc/ui-config/mhdefaultorg/paella7/config.json:571 and :574. The cue text is not HTML-escaped before assignment to innerHTML, and partial-process-uploaded-captions only cuts and tags the file, it never sanitizes it. Opencast sets neither a Content-Security-Policy nor an X-Content-Type-Options header, so the injected script runs without restriction.

Reproduction

Default config, default caption plugins enabled, a non-admin user with ROLEAPIEVENTSCREATE, ROLEAPIEVENTSTRACKEDIT, and ROLEUITASKSCREATE (no ROLEADMIN).

1. As the non-admin user, create an event, then upload a WebVTT subtitle as captions/source whose cue text is an XSS payload, and publish the event.

WEBVTT

00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:30.000 <img src=x onerror=document.title=window.xss=document.domain>

2. The anonymous search manifest then exposes the caption and serves the cue raw.

GET /search/episode.json?id=<event> "type":"captions/source", "url":".../static/.../x.vtt" GET .../static/.../x.vtt -> cue text returned verbatim

3. Open the event in the player as an anonymous viewer, open the captions menu, and select the track; the cue is written to innerHTML and the onerror handler runs.

Live-verified: on Opencast 18.8 (build 8705223) in Chrome, a non-admin author published the subtitle and an anonymous viewer enabled captions, rendering the cue as a live <img> node and setting window.xss and document.title to document.domain. On Opencast 20.0 (build d919405, Paella 8), the served core bundle contains the identical innerHTML += cue sink and the player loads the cue raw; the sink executes JavaScript in the engage origin when fed the player's own published caption file.

Impact

- JavaScript execution in the Opencast origin in the session of any viewer who enables captions on the event. - Anonymous viewers and authenticated staff are equally affected; an instructor or admin viewer exposes that session context to the script. - Session and CSRF-token theft, actions performed as the victim against the Opencast REST API. - Stored by a non-admin content author, triggered by viewing with captions on, no attacker authentication at view time.

Credit

Jan Kahmen, turingpoint (jan@turingpoint.de)