GHSA-mf5c-hw34-4hpp: Path Traversal
Summary
aquaproj/aqua extracts downloaded tool archives through pkg/unarchive/archives.go using github.com/mholt/archives. The archive handler creates symlink entries with os.Symlink(f.LinkTarget, dstPath) without validating that the symlink target resolves inside the extraction destination. A subsequent regular-file archive entry with the same path is opened with OpenFile(dstPath, OCREATE|OWRONLY), which follows the attacker-planted symlink.
A malicious or compromised aqua package / release asset can therefore write attacker-controlled bytes outside aqua's extraction directory, with the privileges of the user running aqua.
Details
Affected file: pkg/unarchive/archives.go
Affected function: (handler).HandleFile
The vulnerable logic is the combination of:
go os.Symlink(f.LinkTarget, dstPath)
for symlink entries, followed by:
go h.fs.OpenFile(dstPath, os.OCREATE|os.OWRONLY, f.Mode())
for a later regular file entry at the same archive path. The symlink target is not jailed to the extraction destination, and the later file open follows the symlink.
The attached PoC uses a two-entry tar.gz archive:
1. symlink pwn -> <outside target>; 2. regular file pwn containing attacker-controlled bytes.
The same mholt/archives extraction flow is used for the vulnerable handler and for a negative-control handler using a destination-root jail.
PoC
Attachment: submissionaquaarchivesymlinktraversalv2final.zip
Run:
bash go run mkarchive.go /tmp/aqua-outside-target go build -o aqua-archive-poc . mkdir -p /tmp/aqua-dest ./aqua-archive-poc vuln /tmp/aqua-dest malicious.tar.gz cat /tmp/aqua-outside-target
mkdir -p /tmp/aqua-dest-safe ./aqua-archive-poc safe /tmp/aqua-dest-safe malicious.tar.gz
Expected vulnerable result:
text /tmp/aqua-outside-target contains PWNEDBYAQUASYMLINKTRAVERSAL
Expected safe-control result:
text The escaping symlink / write is rejected and the outside target is unchanged.
Impact
An attacker who controls an archive that aqua installs can write attacker-controlled content to paths outside the extraction destination, limited by the filesystem permissions of the user running aqua. This can lead to user-level code execution if the overwritten path is later executed or interpreted, for example a shell startup file, a tool configuration file, or a writable PATH entry.
This report does not claim privilege escalation beyond the aqua process privileges.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
go/github.com/aquaproj/aqua/v2to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.60.1
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is exposed to this issue?
Users who run aqua and extract a malicious or compromised package or release asset are exposed. The attacker-controlled write occurs with the privileges of the user running aqua.
What must an attacker control to exploit it?
The attacker needs to provide an archive containing a symlink whose target is outside the extraction directory, followed by a regular-file entry at the same archive path. When aqua processes the later file entry, it follows the planted symlink and writes the attacker-controlled file contents to the external target.
How can I determine whether an archive attempted this technique?
Inspect downloaded archives for a symlink entry followed by a regular-file entry using the same path. A symlink target that resolves outside the extraction destination is the condition that enables the external write.
What version contains the fix?
The advisory references the v2.60.1 release and commit d5b02b220188de376a661b3aabfa912202a1a59a.