GHSA-mpmw-f6h6-3g26: CSRF
Impact
Backend\Controllers\MyAccount, introduced in v1.2.13, declares an empty $requiredPermissions array so that any authenticated backend user can manage their own account. It implements the FormController behavior, which exposes three routable actions — create, update and preview — that each take a record id from the URL.
index() passes the authenticated user's own id to the behavior, but the inherited actions were left routable and formFindModelObject() was not scoped, so a caller-supplied id resolved against an unscoped Backend\Models\User query:
GET /backend/backend/myaccount/preview/{otheruserid}
preview disclosed the target user's first name, last name, login, email address and avatar; update was equally routable and additionally disclosed role, group membership, superuser flag and throttle state. Password controls render a mask, so no credential material was exposed. Backend user ids are sequential and trivially enumerated, and as these are GET actions no CSRF token is involved.
The behavior's AJAX handlers (createonSave, updateonSave, updateonDelete) were also dispatchable on these routes, but cross-user writes were blocked by the Backend\Models\User authorization guards added in v1.2.13. The confirmed impact is unauthorized disclosure of backend user profile data.
To actively exploit this security issue, an attacker would need access to the Backend with a user account with any level of access.
Patches
MyAccount no longer exposes the generic record actions it never used as routes, and its form lookup is now pinned to the authenticated user:
- protected $guarded = ['create', 'update', 'preview']; removes the inherited actions from routing. The guard has to be at the routing layer, as handler dispatch ({action}{handler}) runs before the page action. - formExtendQuery() constrains every lookup made by the behavior to the current user's key.
This security issue has been fixed as of v1.2.14 (commit cdbc8f5a23db27f72ccec658a8e5769e6d9f6dcb).
Workarounds
There is no supported workaround other than upgrading. If you cannot upgrade immediately, you may apply the fix manually in modules/backend/controllers/MyAccount.php:
1. Add protected $guarded = ['create', 'update', 'preview']; to the controller. 2. Add a formExtendQuery() method that scopes the lookup to the current user:
php public function formExtendQuery(\Winter\Storm\Database\Builder $query): void { $query->whereKey($this->user->getKey()); }
References
- https://github.com/wintercms/winter/security/advisories/GHSA-j5jq-cr68-v2xx - https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/cdbc8f5a23db27f72ccec658a8e5769e6d9f6dcb
Credit to Awwader (@NRAwwad) for reporting the issue.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Email us at hello@wintercms.com
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
composer/winter/wn-backend-moduleto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.2.14 - Upgrade
Upgrade
wintercms/winterto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in v1.2.14Patch cdbc8f5a23db27f72ccec658a8e5769e6d9f6dcb - Configuration
Add `protected $guarded = ['create', 'update', 'preview'];` to `modules/backend/controllers/MyAccount.php` to prevent inherited `create`, `update`, and `preview` actions from being routable.
Backend\Controllers\MyAccount (modules/backend/controllers/MyAccount.php) $guarded = ['create','update','preview'] - Configuration
Add a `formExtendQuery()` method to `modules/backend/controllers/MyAccount.php` so that `formFindModelObject()` lookups are constrained to the current authenticated user's key (e.g., via `$query->whereKey($this->user->getKey());`).
Backend\Controllers\MyAccount (modules/backend/controllers/MyAccount.php) formExtendQuery() = Scopes form lookup to the current user key
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can access another backend user's information?
Any authenticated backend user can request the routable preview or update actions with another user's numeric ID. Backend user IDs are sequential and trivially enumerable.
What information can be disclosed?
The preview action exposes the target user's first name, last name, login, email address, and avatar. The update action additionally exposes role, group membership, superuser status, and throttle state; password fields are masked and no credential material is exposed.
Can this issue be used to modify or delete another user's account?
The AJAX save and delete handlers were dispatchable on the affected routes, but cross-user writes were blocked. The described impact is unauthorized cross-user information disclosure.
Is a CSRF token or user interaction required to retrieve the data?
No. The affected actions are GET routes, so no CSRF token is involved, and no user interaction is required.