GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q: High severity npm/trigger.dev vulnerability

Summary

The run replay action function at apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts has no authentication or authorization check. While the loader (GET) in the same file properly calls requireUser(request) and scopes queries to the user's organizations, the action (POST) at line 166 does neither — allowing any authenticated user to replay task runs from any organization by knowing the run's friendlyId.

Details

Vulnerable file: apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts

The loader (line 28-29) — properly authenticated: typescript export async function loader({ request, params }: LoaderFunctionArgs) { const user = await requireUser(request); // ✓ Auth check const userId = user.id; // ... queries scoped to user's orgs }

The action (line 166-193) — NO authentication: typescript export const action: ActionFunction = async ({ request, params }) => { const { runParam } = ParamSchema.parse(params); // ✗ NO requireUser() call // ✗ NO requireUserId() call // ✗ NO org membership check

const taskRun = await prisma.taskRun.findFirst({ where: { friendlyId: runParam, // Queries ANY run, no org scoping }, include: { runtimeEnvironment: { select: { slug: true } }, project: { include: { organization: true } }, }, });

// ... proceeds to replay the run in the victim's environment const replayRunService = new ReplayTaskRunService();

The Prisma query at line 177 fetches the run by friendlyId only — no userId or organization filter. The ReplayTaskRunService then creates a new task run in the victim's environment, executing with the victim's environment variables and secrets.

Same bug class exists in: apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.batches.$batchId.check-completion.ts (line 17) — the action has zero authentication, allowing any user to trigger batch completion for any batch ID.

PoC

Run replay IDOR: bash Any authenticated user can replay any org's task run POST /resources/taskruns/runabc123def/replay Cookie: <any-valid-session> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

environmentId=<victim-env-id>&failedRedirect=/

The friendlyId values (e.g., runabc123def) are short, incrementing strings that can be enumerated.

Batch completion (same bug class): bash Any authenticated user can trigger batch completion for any batch POST /resources/batches/<batchId>/check-completion Cookie: <any-valid-session> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

redirectUrl=/

Impact

- Cross-organization task execution: An attacker can replay task runs belonging to other organizations, executing tasks in the victim's environment with the victim's secrets and API keys - Secret exposure: Replayed tasks run with the victim organization's environment variables, which may contain database credentials, API keys, and other secrets - Resource consumption: Attacker consumes the victim's compute quota by replaying their tasks - Data integrity: The batch completion endpoint can prematurely resume parent tasks waiting for batch results, causing data integrity issues - Low attack complexity: friendlyId values are short, predictable strings — enumeration is feasible