GHSA-pr6h-vr44-xq8j: Medium severity go/github.com/obot-platform/obot vulnerability
Summary
In affected versions, enabling registry authentication (OBOTSERVERENABLEREGISTRYAUTH=true) does not actually protect the MCP Registry endpoints under /v0.1/ — they remain readable by unauthenticated callers.
Am I affected?
You are affected if you run Obot <= v0.22.1 with OBOTSERVERENABLEREGISTRYAUTH=true. An unauthenticated GET /v0.1/servers returns 200 OK with catalog server metadata. (With registry auth disabled, the registry is intentionally public and this is not a defect.)
Details
The authorizer rejects a fixed set of known-protected prefixes and then default-allows everything else. The registry is mounted at the top-level /v0.1 prefix, which was not in that set, so anonymous requests were authorized before the WWW-Authenticate challenge for /v0.1 was ever reached. The registry handler still applies its own per-user ACR filtering, so an anonymous caller receives only entries accessible to the anonymous identity (e.g. default-catalog/wildcard entries), and responses contain names, descriptions, repository URLs, icons, and connect URLs — not secret env/header values. This is the same root cause as GHSA-vw82-7fv8-r6gp, whose fix protected /mcp-connect/ but not the /v0.1 registry prefix.
Impact
Worst case is disclosure of the registry server inventory (names, descriptions, repository URLs, connect URLs) that the operator explicitly chose to put behind authentication. No credential values are exposed and unauthenticated users cannot connect to the servers because connecting is properly protected by auth.
Mitigation
Upgrade to v0.23.0 or later, in which the /v0.1 registry prefix is treated as a protected route so authentication is enforced for unauthenticated callers.
Severity
CVSS v3.1 Score: 5.3/10 (Medium) — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Credits
The Obot team would like to thank HE WEI（ギカク）(https://www.linkedin.com/in/gikaku, @hewei-gikaku) for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with our security policy.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
go/github.com/obot-platform/obotto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.23.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
obot-platform/obotto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in v0.23.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to unauthenticated registry access?
Deployments running Obot version v0.22.1 or earlier with OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_REGISTRY_AUTH=true are affected. Deployments with registry authentication disabled intentionally expose the registry publicly and are not affected by this defect.
What can an unauthenticated caller obtain?
An unauthenticated caller can read registry entries available to the anonymous identity, such as default-catalog or wildcard entries. Exposed metadata can include names, descriptions, repository URLs, icons, and connect URLs; secret environment and header values are not exposed.
How can I verify whether my deployment is affected?
With registry authentication enabled, send an unauthenticated GET request to /v0.1/servers. A 200 OK response containing catalog server metadata indicates the deployment is affected.
What version addresses the issue?
The referenced Obot v0.23.0 release contains the fix.