GHSA-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6: Pocket ID: Email verification token remains valid after address change, enabling arbitrary verified-email spoofing
Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/emailverificationtoken.go to bind an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with emailverified set to true. The default affected configuration uses emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; the target address must not already belong to another Pocket ID user. A relying application that trusts a verified email for automatic account matching or provisioning can link the attacker's identity to another user's account, while applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
Pocket IDto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.12.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed by the default settings?
The default affected configuration has emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true. In that configuration, an ordinary authenticated user can exploit the issue as long as the target email address is unused by another Pocket ID user.
What does an attacker need to do to exploit this?
The attacker needs a Pocket ID account and an email address they control to obtain a verification token. They then change their account email to an arbitrary unused target address and redeem the previously issued token, causing the current address to be marked verified.
Which relying applications face the downstream account-linking risk?
Applications that trust a verified email address for automatic account matching or provisioning may link the attacker's identity to another user's account. Applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence.
What version fixes the issue?
The issue is fixed in Pocket ID version 2.12.0.