GHSA-rr49-f9g6-c9r5: Path Traversal

Published Sep 23, 2026
·
Updated

Impact The Classic portlet (plone.app.portlets.portlets.classic) used its user-supplied template/macro fields to build a TALES path expression that was then evaluated by the TAL path() helper. Because the value was interpreted as a full TALES expression, a user able to add or edit a Classic portlet could supply a crafted value that escapes simple path traversal and is evaluated as arbitrary code.

This is exploitable by any authenticated user who can configure a Classic portlet - which, with the default role map, includes regular users on their personal dashboard. The result is code execution in the context of the Plone process, i.e. a privilege escalation across the trust boundary between an authenticated web user and the server-side process.

Patches The problem has been patched in plone.app.portlets

For Plone 6.2, upgrade to plone.app.portlets 7.0.2. For Plone 6.1, upgrade to plone.app.portlets 6.0.4. For Plone 6.0, upgrade to plone.app.portlets 5.0.8.

Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible:

- Restrict who can manage portlets: remove the plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets permission from untrusted roles, and limit Manage portlets to trusted administrators (usually this is already restricted to the Manager and Site Administrator roles). - Where the Classic portlet is not needed, unregister it so it cannot be added. This would need to be done by editing a portlets.xml in your own code, so it is not a quick fix. - You could also effectively disable showing the classic portlet by customising its template. In the Zope Management Interface go to the portalviewcustomizations tool, locate the classic.pt template and click it. Click the Customize button. Remove all text and replace it with <div>The classic portlet was disabled.</div>. (This is not a recommended way of customising a template, but in this case it is quite effective.)

Credits

Discovered by Giuseppe Caruso, and reported to the Plone/Zope Security Team. Thanks!

Affected Software

3 affected componentsFixes available
pip/plone.app.portlets>=5.0.0<=5.0.7
5.0.8
pip/plone.app.portlets>=6.0.0<=6.0.3
6.0.4
pip/plone.app.portlets>=7.0.0<=7.0.1
7.0.2

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/plone.app.portlets to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 5.0.8
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/plone.app.portlets to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.0.4
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/plone.app.portlets to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 7.0.2
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade plone.app.portlets to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 5.0.8
  5. Upgrade

    Upgrade plone.app.portlets to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.0.4
  6. Upgrade

    Upgrade plone.app.portlets to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 7.0.2
  7. Configuration

    Remove the plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets permission from untrusted roles and limit Manage portlets access to trusted administrators.

    Plone portlet management plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets permission = removed from untrusted roles
  8. Configuration

    Where the Classic portlet is not needed, unregister it so it cannot be added.

    Classic portlet portlet registration = unregistered
  9. Configuration

    If upgrading is not immediately possible, locate classic.pt in the portal_view_customizations tool, remove all text, and replace it with <div>The classic portlet was disabled.</div>.

    portal_view_customizations classic.pt template = <div>The classic portlet was disabled.</div>

Event History

Sep 23, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·01:55 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·01:55 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who can exploit this in a default Plone role configuration?

Any authenticated user who can configure a Classic portlet can exploit it. With the default role map, this includes regular users managing Classic portlets on their personal dashboard.

2

What level of access and impact does exploitation involve?

An attacker needs an authenticated account with permission to add or edit a Classic portlet. Successful exploitation results in arbitrary code execution in the Plone process, crossing the boundary from an authenticated web user to the server-side process.

3

Which plone.app.portlets versions contain fixes?

For Plone 6.2, upgrade to plone.app.portlets 7.0.2. For Plone 6.1, upgrade to 6.0.4; for Plone 6.0, upgrade to 5.0.8.

4

What can be done if an upgrade cannot be applied immediately?

Restrict portlet-management permissions. Remove plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets from untrusted roles and limit the Manage portlets permission to trusted users.

Contact

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