GHSA-v7ph-r5r6-4jcj: Path Traversal
CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72808.
Summary
The /api/asset/getFileAnnotation endpoint returns the content of .sya PDF-annotation files with no publish-access check. It is gated by CheckAuth only, so it is reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. Its sibling, the /assets/ asset route does enforce publish access, including the publish password. An anonymous reader who knows an asset path can therefore read the private PDF annotations (highlights, notes) attached to assets in publish-forbidden, password-protected, or unpublished documents.
Details
getFileAnnotation resolves the annotation file via GetAssetAbsPathInBox (no path traversal) and returns the .sya content. Unlike the /assets/ route, which applies the publish-access filter including password enforcement before serving asset bytes, getFileAnnotation applies no publish-access, publish-ignore, or password check. The guarded-sibling asymmetry indicates the boundary is meant to apply to this data and was omitted here.
.sya files for encrypted-box assets are fail-closed and not exposed. The gap is limited to non-encrypted assets.
Route / auth tier. getFileAnnotation is registered CheckAuth-only. CheckAuth admits RoleReader; the publish proxy forwards port-6808 traffic with a Reader JWT (anonymous when publish auth is disabled).
Proof of Concept
Reproduced on a local instance (publish mode on 6808, Basic Auth off).
Setup (admin, 6806): 1. createNotebook{name:"AnnotPoc"} → box 2. createDocWithMd{notebook, path:"/annot-victim", markdown:"doc with a pdf"} → doc 3. POST /api/asset/upload (multipart id=<doc>, file[]=@secret.pdf) → assets/secret-...pdf 4. setFileAnnotation{path:"<asset>.sya", data:"{annotSecret:ANNOTSECRET4471,note:private highlight}"} 5. setPublishAccess{id:<doc>, visible:false, password:"", disable:true} → doc forbidden
Exploit (anonymous reader, 6808, no token): POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/asset/getFileAnnotation {"path":"assets/secret-...pdf.sya"} Returns: {"code":0,"data":{"data":"{\"annotSecret\":\"ANNOTSECRET4471\",\"note\":\"private highlight\"}"}} The annotation content of a publish-forbidden document is returned to an anonymous reader with no publish-access check, while the /assets/ route serving the same asset class enforces publish access and password.
Impact
An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader can read the private PDF annotations (highlights and notes) of assets belonging to publish-forbidden, password-protected, or unpublished documents, given the asset path. This defeats the publish-access/password boundary for annotation data. Scope is limited to annotated PDFs in non-encrypted notebooks; encrypted-box annotations are not exposed. Confidentiality-only.
Suggested fix
Apply the same publish-access check the /assets/ route uses to getFileAnnotation resolve the asset's owning document and enforce the publish-access/publish-ignore / password check before returning .sya content.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
go/github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.0.0-20260723031702-509b35055940 - Configuration
Modify the /api/asset/getFileAnnotation handler to apply the same publish-access check used by the /assets/* route: resolve the owning document, then enforce publish-access/publish-ignore and the publish password before returning the .sya (PDF annotation) content.
Asset service (/api/asset/getFileAnnotation) publish-access and password enforcement = enabled - Configuration
Update /api/asset/getFileAnnotation so it does not rely solely on CheckAuth; ensure publish-forbidden and password-protected document assets cannot have their .sya annotation files returned.
Authentication gating for /api/asset/getFileAnnotation authorization requirement = CheckAuth only is insufficient; add publish-access checks
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to anonymous access?
Instances with Publish.Auth.Enable set to false allow the anonymous account to reach the endpoint. The endpoint is also reachable with a publish RoleReader token.
What does an attacker need to access private annotations?
An attacker needs to know an asset path for a document with attached .sya annotation files. No publish-access, publish-ignore, or publish-password check is applied by this endpoint.
What data can be disclosed?
The endpoint returns the contents of .sya PDF-annotation files, including annotations such as highlights and notes. This can expose annotations associated with publish-forbidden, password-protected, or unpublished documents.
Does the issue allow path traversal outside the asset location?
No. The annotation file is resolved through GetAssetAbsPathInBox, and the provided information states that this does not permit path traversal.