GHSA-v9pv-5gc8-w2m6: Critical severity pip/Pillow vulnerability

Published Oct 22, 2026
·
Updated

Summary Pillow multi-frame image loaders can retain native ImagingCore storage allocated for one frame while changing the Python-side image mode and decoder tiles for a later frame.

If frame 0 allocates storage for a narrow mode such as L, and a later frame of the same dimensions switches to a wider mode such as RGB or CMYK, Pillow may decode wider pixels into the stale narrow native buffer. This causes native out-of-bounds writes and process crashes. In the MPO/JPEG path, I also demonstrated command execution in matching Python/Pillow runtime profiles through Pillow's documented ImageSequence.Iterator + frame.load() path.

Details The root cause appears to be that ImageFile.loadprepare() only reallocates native storage when im is None. It does not verify that the retained native ImagingCore storage still matches self.mode and self.size.

Several multi-frame seek() / open() paths can update self.mode and decoder tiles for a later frame without invalidating im. The decoder then writes or reads according to the new frame mode while the native storage still belongs to the old frame mode.

Verified affected surfaces:

1. PSD

PsdImageFile.seek() can switch from grayscale/native L storage to RGB layer decoding while retaining im. This produces attacker-controlled native out-of-bounds writes and reliable crashes.

2. MPO/JPEG

A crafted two-frame MPO can make frame 0 allocate L storage, then make frame 1 decode CMYK / RGB data into the retained L storage. The documented ImageSequence.Iterator path reaches this with frame.load(). Verified native memory corruption, crash, over-read behavior, and scoped harmless-marker command execution on Pillow 12.3.0.

3. DCX

DcxImageFile.seek() calls PcxImageFile.open(), which changes mode/tile state without a native-storage mode guard. A crafted DCX with L then RGB PCX frames produces retained-storage mismatch and crash.

4. MIC

MIC can call TiffImageFile.open() directly and bypass TIFF's normal guarded seek() behavior. With a NextIFD-based reachable frame transition, this produces retained-storage mismatch and crash.

TIFF appears to be a useful positive control because its seek() path checks both size and mode before reusing storage.

Impact - process crash / denial of service, - native out-of-bounds write, - native over-read in the MPO path.

Stronger proven impact:

- command execution in matching Python/Pillow runtime profiles through the MPO/JPEG path.

Server-side deployment impact:

- Create a local vulnerable web upload service that accepts an unauthenticated MPO upload and automatically processes it with Pillow. - The attack is one HTTP request and requires no user interaction after upload. - The fixed harmless command-output marker succeeded 10/10 times. - The im=None control was clean 10/10 times.

Reproduction Evidence

Tested version:

text Pillow 12.3.0

MPO terminal proof environments:

text Python 3.12.3 + Pillow 12.3.0, clean PyPI environment: marker 10/10, control 0/10

Python 3.13.14 + Pillow 12.3.0, prepared profile: marker 10/10, control 0/10

Server-side web-upload proof:

text control 1..10: MARKERMISSING controlsummary ok 0 missing 10 /10

vulnerable 1..10: MARKEROK markeroutput <server-user> vulnerablesummary ok 10 missing 0 /10

The terminal proof uses a fixed harmless marker command only. It does not use a reverse shell, persistence, data exfiltration, or arbitrary attacker-selected commands.

I can provide the following private artifacts to maintainers:

- minimal crash fixtures for PSD, MPO, DCX, and MIC, - non-weaponized MPO marker PoC, - local vulnerable web upload demo, - gdb/GEF geometry receipts, - control-run logs, - proposed regression-test shape.

Minimal Reproduction Shape

For the MPO path, the vulnerable consumer shape is:

python from io import BytesIO from PIL import Image, ImageSequence

source = BytesIO(open(path, "rb").read()) image = Image.open(source) iterator = ImageSequence.Iterator(image) next(iterator).load() next(iterator).load()

The crafted image shape is:

text frame 0: mode L, dimensions W x H frame 1: same W x H, wider mode such as CMYK

Frame 0 allocates native L storage. Frame 1 changes the logical mode and decoder state but can reuse the old native storage. The frame 1 decoder writes using the wider mode into the narrow storage.

Suggested Fix Direction

Before reusing native ImagingCore storage, Pillow should verify that the retained storage is compatible with the current logical image mode and size.

A central guard in ImageFile.loadprepare() could compare native storage mode/size against self.mode / self.size and allocate fresh storage when they differ. Alternatively, every mode-changing seek() / open() path should explicitly invalidate im before decoding.

Caution: TIFF has specialized tile-size behavior and already has a mode/size guard, so a central fix should avoid regressing TIFF tile-buffer handling.

Credit

text Rotem Kama

Methodology Note

AI-assisted analysis was used for discovery and verification support. Claims in this report are limited to the local artifacts, controls, and command outputs described above.

Affected Software

1 affected componentFixes available
pip/Pillow>=11.0.0<13.0.0
13.0.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/Pillow to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 13.0.0
  2. Compensating control

    Modify Pillow multi-frame loading so ImageFile.load_prepare() verifies retained native ImagingCore storage against the current self.mode and self.size and allocates fresh storage when they differ; alternatively, invalidate _im on every mode-changing seek() or _open() path before decoding. Preserve TIFF's specialized tile-size handling and existing mode/size guard.

Event History

Oct 22, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·04:00 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·04:00 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which applications are realistically exposed?

Applications that process untrusted multi-frame images and decode a later frame after an earlier frame are the relevant exposure scenario. The documented MPO/JPEG proof of command execution uses Pillow's ImageSequence.Iterator followed by frame.load().

2

What must an attacker-controlled file do to trigger the memory corruption?

The file needs an initial frame that allocates native storage for a narrower pixel mode, such as L, followed by a same-sized frame decoded in a wider mode, such as RGB or CMYK. The later frame must be loaded while Pillow retains the native ImagingCore storage from the earlier frame.

3

Is the impact limited to process crashes?

No. Native out-of-bounds writes can crash the process, and command execution was demonstrated for the MPO/JPEG path in matching Python and Pillow runtime profiles.

4

Which formats are explicitly identified in the available advisory details?

The available details explicitly identify PSD and MPO/JPEG paths. They do not establish that every multi-frame image format is affected.

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