GHSA-vj8h-fx38-h3vc: High severity pip/graphql-core vulnerability

Published Oct 22, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

The OverlappingFieldsCanBeMerged validation rule can be driven into quadratic — and in the worst case O(n²·m²) — running time by a small, highly compressible query. A single 364 KB document can occupy one CPU core for over five minutes during validation, before any resolver runs. Because the rule is part of specifiedrules and therefore enabled by default, every GraphQL-core based server is affected at default settings.

Details

OverlappingFieldsCanBeMerged compares every pair of fields that share a response name and recurses into their sub-selections. The memoization added for CVE-2023-26144 (GHSA-9pv7-vfvm-6vr7) is keyed by named fragment identity, so it does not cover this path: inline fragments are flattened into the parent selection set before the cache is consulted, and therefore every pair is re-compared from scratch at every nesting level.

Repeating an inline fragment that selects the same response name at two nesting levels multiplies the two effects. There was no comparison budget and no validation timeout, so the rule ran to completion regardless of cost.

The cost is incurred in the validation phase, which is what makes this hard to defend against from outside the library: query-depth limiters, complexity analyzers and cost estimators all operate on the parsed document after validation, and the malicious document is trivially shallow (depth 3, complexity 1). The payload is also one short string repeated many times, so it compresses to a few kilobytes and slips past body-size limits and WAF inspection that only see the compressed request.

Proof of concept

python import time from graphql import buildschema, parse, validate

schema = buildschema( "type Query { field: Node } type Node { f: Node, g: Node, x: String }" )

def gen(n: int, m: int) -> str: inner = " ".join(["... on Node { x }"] m) outer = " ".join([f"... on Node {{ f {{ {inner} }} }}"] n) return f"{{ field {{ {outer} }} }}"

query = gen(200, 100) # 364 KB, gzips to a few KB document = parse(query) start = time.perfcounter() validate(schema, document) # returns no errors — it just burns CPU print(f"{(time.perfcounter() - start):.0f}s")

Measured on GraphQL-core 3.2.8 / CPython 3.12 / Linux x8664:

| n | m | query size | validation time | |---|---|---|---| | 20 | 20 | 7.6 KB | 0.16 s | | 50 | 50 | 46 KB | 5.2 s | | 100 | 100 | 182 KB | 81 s | | 200 | 100 | 364 KB | 319 s |

Doubling n at fixed m quadruples the time, as expected for a quadratic outer loop driving a quadratic inner walk.

Impact

Denial of service. One request pins one worker process for minutes; because CPython holds the GIL for this pure-CPU work, a handful of concurrent requests can saturate a typical multi-worker deployment. No authentication is required, and no data is disclosed or modified.

Patches

Fixed in 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.

Validation now enforces a per-document comparison budget. Once MAXFIELDCOMPARISONS (default 250000) pairwise comparisons have been made, the rule aborts and reports a GraphQLError instead of running to completion:

Query is too complex to validate for overlapping fields: exceeded 250000 field comparisons. Validation was aborted.

The default is far above what any realistic query reaches. It is a module-level constant and can be raised or lowered:

python from graphql.validation.rules import overlappingfieldscanbemerged

overlappingfieldscanbemerged.MAXFIELDCOMPARISONS = 1000000

Note the behaviour change: a pathological query that previously validated — slowly — now produces a validation error.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade, reject oversized documents before they reach validate(). Note that a request body-size limit must be applied to the decompressed body to be effective here, since the payload is highly compressible. Removing OverlappingFieldsCanBeMergedRule from the rule set is not a safe workaround: it is a correctness rule required by the specification.

A body-size limit remains worthwhile after upgrading — the comparison budget bounds this specific rule, not overall request cost.

Credits

Reported by @BZHunt, who also reviewed the fixes before release. In memory of ZaX, who was the driving force behind this discovery.

Independently found and diagnosed by @bcmyguest, who also proposed a fix.

Affected Software

2 affected componentsFixes available
pip/graphql-core>=3.3.0a1<3.3.0rc1
3.3.0rc1
pip/graphql-core>=3.0.0<3.2.12
3.2.12

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/graphql-core to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.3.0rc1
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/graphql-core to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.2.12
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade graphql-core to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.2.12
  4. Compensating control

    If upgrading is not possible, reject oversized GraphQL documents before they reach validate(), and apply any request body-size limit to the decompressed body.

Event History

Oct 22, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·04:26 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·04:26 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed by default?

Every GraphQL-core-based server using the default validation rules is affected, because OverlappingFieldsCanBeMerged is included in specified_rules by default.

2

What must an attacker be able to do to trigger the issue?

An attacker needs to submit a GraphQL document containing repeated inline fragments that select the same response name. No privileges or user interaction are required according to the supplied severity vector.

3

What is the practical impact during an attack?

The expensive work occurs during query validation, before any resolver runs. A 364 KB query can consume one CPU core for more than five minutes, enabling denial of service.

4

How can operators recognize attempted exploitation?

Look for unusually high CPU consumption during GraphQL validation associated with relatively small, highly compressible queries containing repeated inline fragments and overlapping response names. Resolver activity may not be present because the cost is incurred before execution.

Contact

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