GHSA-vx2m-jpxr-xv7w: Medium severity go/github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 vulnerability

Summary Cloudreve's file-listing responses hand the client a contexthint (UUID) that is meant to speed up follow-up operations. When that hint is replayed on the file/url (and file/thumb) routes, DBFS caches a shareNavigatorState containing the already-loaded share root and share row. On a later request carrying the same hint, shareNavigator.RestoreState repopulates shareRoot, and shareNavigator.To then skips Root. Root is the only place that re-checks inventory.IsValidShare (share expiry, remaining-download count, owner status, source-file validity) and the share password. As a result, a recipient who prewarms a context hint while access is valid can keep minting signed file URLs for already-known shared file paths for up to the context-hint TTL (5 60 = 300 s) after the owner deletes the share or the share expires — plus the lifetime of any signed entity URL minted in that window. This is a revocation / expiry bypass, not a way to discover unknown share contents: the attacker must already have had access to the share and must know the target file URI from a prior listing.

Root cause (verified at 26b6b10) 1. List responses leak the hint and each file URI — service/explorer/response.go populates ListResponse.ContextHint and FileResponse.Path (f.Uri(false).String()). 2. file/url and file/thumb accept the client-supplied hint — routers/router.go:631 and :662: go file.POST("url", middleware.ContextHint(), / ... / controllers.FileURL) file.GET("thumb", middleware.ContextHint(), / ... / controllers.Thumb) The file group's only auth gate is middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeFilesRead) — there is no independent share-validation middleware on this route. All share validation lives inside DBFS. 3. The middleware trusts the header verbatim — middleware/file.go:41: go func ContextHint() gin.HandlerFunc { return func(c gin.Context) { if c.GetHeader(dbfs.ContextHintHeader) != "" { // X-Cr-Context-Hint util.WithValue(c, dbfs.ContextHintCtxKey{}, uuid.FromStringOrNil(c.GetHeader(dbfs.ContextHintHeader))) } c.Next() } } 4. DBFS restores cached navigator state on a hint hit — dbfs.go:745 (ContextHintTTL = 5 60, dbfs.go:34). On a miss it arms PersistState; the closure fires in DBFS.Recycle() at end of request. 5. Persisted share state carries the loaded shareRoot + share row — sharenavigator.go:72/:85. RestoreState reinstates n.shareRoot, n.share, n.owner, etc. 6. Root is the sole validity/password gate — sharenavigator.go:114 → inventory.IsValidShare(share) (inventory/share.go:227: IsShareExpired checks Expires.Before(now) and RemainDownloads <= 0, plus owner-active and source-file checks) followed by the share.Password comparison. 7. To skips Root once shareRoot is set — sharenavigator.go:181: go func (n shareNavigator) To(ctx context.Context, path fs.URI) (File, error) { if n.shareRoot == nil { // restored state => NOT nil => Root() skipped root, err := n.Root(ctx, path) ... } ... } The single-file-share branch is also affected: it calls latestSharedSingleFile, which fetches n.fileClient.GetByID(n.share.Edges.File.ID) straight from the restored share with no revalidation (sharenavigator.go). 8. A failed download hook does not block URL issuance — pkg/filemanager/manager/entity.go:250: go if err := m.fs.ExecuteNavigatorHooks(ctx, fs.HookTypeBeforeDownload, file); err != nil { m.l.Warning("Failed to execute navigator hooks: %s", err) // logged, NOT fatal } The share's BeforeDownload hook is shareClient.Downloaded() (UpdateOneID(share.ID).AddDownloads(1).AddRemainDownloads(-1)). Against a deleted share this update errors, but the error is only logged and the signed URL is still minted. The signed content endpoint file/content/:id/... is then guarded only by middleware.SignRequired — it does not re-check the share.

Steps to reproduce Setup: one share owner; one recipient (a second free account, or anonymous if the default anon group keeps share-download). Recipient knows the share URL (and password, if any). 1. Recipient lists the valid share: GET /api/v4/file?uri=<share-uri> HTTP/1.1 Host: target Response includes contexthint and each file's path. 2. While the share is still valid, recipient warms the cache for a known file: POST /api/v4/file/url HTTP/1.1 Host: target X-Cr-Context-Hint: <contexthint> Content-Type: application/json {"uri":["<known-shared-file-uri>"]} (cache MISS → Root runs → PersistState armed → Recycle writes shareNavigatorState to KV under navigatorstate<hint>share.) 3. Owner deletes the share, or it expires / hits zero remaining downloads. 4. Within 300 s, recipient repeats the same request from step 2 (same X-Cr-Context-Hint, same URI). (cache HIT → RestoreState sets shareRoot → To skips Root → IsValidShare never runs → signed entity URL returned.) 5. The signed URL serves the file content; file/content/:id/... validates only the signature. Expected: step 4 returns ErrShareNotFound / ErrShareLinkExpired. Actual: step 4 returns a signed, downloadable URL. Impact A former share recipient (including an anonymous one, under default permissions) can keep minting signed download URLs for already-known shared files for up to 300 s after the owner deletes the share or after time/download-limit expiry, plus the validity window of each signed URL minted in that period. It defeats owner revocation, time expiry, and the remaining-download limit, and bypasses password revalidation on cached state. Remediation - On RestoreState, re-run inventory.IsValidShare and re-compare the current share.Password before trusting cached shareRoot; or bind the cached state to an authorization version that changes on any share edit/delete/download-limit change. - Do not store authorization-sensitive share state in context-hint cache; treat the hint as a pagination/perf token only. - Invalidate navigatorstate entries when a share is edited or deleted. - Treat HookTypeBeforeDownload failures as blocking for share-backed downloads. - Add a regression test: list + prewarm hint, delete share, then file/url with the same hint must fail.