GHSA-w8wf-3qvj-6xqf: High severity npm/@openclaw/feishu vulnerability
Summary
Feishu permission tools could ignore per-account disablement. In affected versions, a lower-trust caller or configured input path could perform actions that should have required a stronger authorization or policy check.
This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
Impact
When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could perform actions that should have required a stronger authorization or policy check. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.
Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is 2026.6.9.
Mitigations
Upgrade to a patched OpenClaw release when one is listed. Before upgrading, restrict the affected feature to trusted operators or disable it when it is not needed. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@openclaw/feishuto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2026.6.9 - Upgrade
Upgrade
OpenClawto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2026.6.9 - Configuration
Disable the affected OpenClaw feature when it is not needed; if it is enabled, restrict it to trusted operators so only authenticated, trusted operators can reach it.
OpenClaw (affected feature) affected feature = disable when not needed - Configuration
Apply general hardening by keeping channel and tool allowlists narrow.
OpenClaw channel/tool allowlists = narrow - Configuration
Avoid using a single Gateway between mutually untrusted users; separate Gateways or enforce trust boundaries so lower-trust callers cannot reach the trusted operator execution path.
OpenClaw Gateway deployment Gateway sharing model = avoid shared Gateway between mutually untrusted users
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is realistically exposed to this issue?
Exposure depends on the affected Feishu feature being enabled and reachable, and on lower-trust callers or input paths being able to reach it. Authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless another policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or authentication boundary is crossed.
What does an attacker need to exploit it?
A lower-trust caller or configured input path must be able to invoke the affected feature. The issue can allow actions to proceed despite per-account disablement when a stronger authorization or policy check should have been required.
What can be done before upgrading?
Restrict the affected feature to trusted operators or disable it if it is not needed. Keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable affected functionality where practical.
Which version contains the fix?
The first stable patched OpenClaw version is 2026.6.9.