GHSA-wq4w-vwvq-q3x9: SQL Injection

Published Oct 15, 2026
·
Updated

Summary Standalone short tokens issued for WebSocket and explicit-token authentication can survive administrative revocation in cache. If the same account is later re-enabled before the cache entry expires, the deleted short token becomes valid again.

Details GenerateShortToken() creates an AuthToken row that contains only ShortToken and no long Token. DeleteUserTokens() removes database rows, but when clearing caches it only invalidates entries where authToken.Token != "". This leaves standalone short-token cache entries behind. GetTokenUserByShortToken() checks that cache first and then loads the user by ID, so the stale short token becomes usable again if the account status is restored to true.

Relevant code paths: - internal/user/user.go - internal/user/user.go - internal/user/user.go - api/user/shorttoken.go - internal/middleware/middleware.go

PoC This was verfied locally in an isolated environment with a temporary package-level harness that exercised the real token issuance, revocation, cache, and re-authentication paths.

What the executed test did: 1. Created an enabled user in a temporary SQLite database. 2. Called the real GenerateShortToken(user.ID) function to issue a standalone short token. 3. Verified that the token authenticated successfully and was present in the short-token cache. 4. Disabled the user and called the real DeleteUserTokens(user.ID) function. 5. Verified that the database token rows were removed. 6. Verified that the short-token cache entry still existed after DeleteUserTokens. 7. Re-enabled the same user. 8. Reused the previously deleted short token via the real GetTokenUserByShortToken() path and observed successful authentication.

Observed result from the actual local verification: - The database token rows were removed during revocation. - The short-token cache entry remained present. - Re-enabling the user restored successful authentication through the stale short token.

Impact Any deployment using standalone short tokens is affected. If a short token is stolen, administrative disable/delete-token handling may not fully revoke it. Re-enabling the account within the cache lifetime restores access for the stale token to any HTTP or WebSocket routes that accept short-token authentication.

Affected Software

1 affected componentFixes available
go/github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI<1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade go/github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0

Event History

Oct 15, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·08:14 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·08:14 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which authentication flows are affected?

The issue affects standalone short tokens issued for WebSocket authentication and explicit-token authentication. These tokens are stored without a corresponding long Token value.

2

What conditions are required for a revoked token to become usable again?

An administrator must revoke the user's tokens, leaving the standalone short-token cache entry intact, and later re-enable that same account before the cache entry expires. The stale short token can then authenticate because the cache is checked before the user is loaded.

3

Are tokens with an associated long token affected in the same way?

The described cache invalidation logic removes entries only when authToken.Token is non-empty. Standalone short tokens have no long Token value, which is why their cached entries remain after deletion.

Contact

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