GHSA-x26x-7f4v-cqx7: SNARK Verifier: Halo 2 aggregation mishandles point-at-infinity proof elements

Published Oct 30, 2026
·
Updated

SNARK Verifier is a generic (S)NARK verifier. Prior to 0.2.5, the Halo 2 aggregation circuit can mishandle proof points encoded as the point at infinity. EcPointLoader::multiscalarmultiplication places a Value::Assigned() base paired with Value::Constant(ONE) into its unscaled variable-base list and passes it directly to sumwithconst. The default shim delegates to halo2-lib EccChip::sum, whose incomplete affine addition assumes nonidentity input points. A prover-controlled proof point encoded as (0, 0) can therefore enter the final aggregation sum through the scalar-one shortcut and affect the MSM or accumulator computation. Practical exploitability depends on the surrounding aggregation and final-decider checks; the advisory does not establish universal acceptance of invalid proofs. This issue is fixed in version 0.2.5.

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade SNARK Verifier to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 0.2.5

Event History

Oct 30, 2026
CVE Published
via OSV·08:00 PM
Data Sourced
via OSV·08:00 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who is exposed to this issue?

Deployments using SNARK Verifier versions earlier than 0.2.5 that use the Halo 2 aggregation circuit may be exposed. Exposure specifically depends on whether prover-controlled proof points can reach the aggregation path and on the surrounding aggregation and final-decider checks.

2

What does an attacker need to supply?

An attacker needs to provide a proof containing a point encoded as the point at infinity, represented as `(0, 0)`. The affected path is reached when that point is handled through the scalar-one shortcut in multi-scalar multiplication.

3

Is an invalid proof known to be accepted in every affected deployment?

No. The advisory states that practical exploitability depends on the surrounding aggregation and final-decider checks and does not establish universal acceptance of invalid proofs.

4

What is the available remediation?

Upgrade SNARK Verifier to version 0.2.5, which fixes this issue.

Contact

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