GHSA-x2vm-cf3p-m2w8: High severity npm/@libp2p/gossipsub vulnerability

Published Nov 17, 2026
·
Updated

Summary A single gossipsub peer can grow a node's topics map without bound by flooding subscription RPCs, because the default configuration has no global, per-peer, or topic-length cap and peer scoring does not penalise subscription volume. The peer is never greylisted, so the growth continues toward OOM.

Details handleReceivedSubscription (packages/gossipsub/src/gossipsub.ts:1028, line 1036) runs this.topics.set(topic, new Set()) for every distinct topic string:

ts private handleReceivedSubscription (from, topic, subscribe) { let topicSet = this.topics.get(topic) if (subscribe) { if (topicSet == null) { topicSet = new Set() this.topics.set(topic, topicSet) // no global cap, no per-peer cap } topicSet.add(from.toString()) } }

The only topical gate (gossipsub.ts:981, if (this.allowedTopics != null && !this.allowedTopics.has(topic)) return) is skipped when allowedTopics is null — the default. Subscriptions are unsigned RPC metadata (no signature needed); decodeRpc's per-RPC limit caps count (maxSubscriptions = 5000) but not topic-string length or aggregate size; and the peer-scoring components P1–P7 have no subscription-volume term, so the attacker's score stays at 0 (above the graylistThreshold of −80) and acceptFrom keeps returning true. Verified on js-libp2p commit a04f5e0, where @libp2p/gossipsub reads 16.0.4.

PoC Full PoC attached (gossipsub-topics-unbounded-growth-poc.tar.gz). Build the js-libp2p monorepo at the affected version (npm install --ignore-scripts && npm run build), extract the package inside the monorepo root (sibling of packages/), then cd gossipsub-topics-unbounded-growth-poc && node attack.mjs. Expected (default config):

[] sending 300 RPC frames x 4000 unique ~190-byte topic subscriptions (1,200,000 topics total) [] progress: 88% sent | victim topics=1,032,000 rss=740MB peers=1 [] victim quiesced: topics=~1,100,000 rss=~870MB peers=1 [!] Vulnerability reproduced: one connected peer grew the victim's gossipsub topics map to ~1.1M entries (RSS +~900MB) with 300 subscription RPCs — no global, per-peer, or topic-length cap in the default config

Control run (ALLOWEDTOPICS=legit-topic, i.e. node attack.mjs control): the identical flood is rejected at the allowedTopics gate and the topics map stays at 0 entries — confirming the vulnerable condition is the default allowedTopics-unset config. The map grows monotonically with no cap until the victim's own resource pressure trips; on disconnect removePeer performs an O(N) sweep over every topic entry (a secondary CPU cost) while the ~1 GB heap stays committed.

Impact CWE-400/CWE-770. Every node running default gossipsub is affected; the attacker needs only one connection and is never rate-limited or greylisted. Growth continues toward OOM; on disconnect the O(N) removePeer sweep adds CPU cost. Suggested fix: bound by default (not opt-in) — a global cap on topics.size, a per-peer subscription cap with a P7 behaviour penalty so acceptFrom eventually greylists, a topic-string length cap at decode time, and/or flipping allowedTopics to deny-by-default; make removePeer's topic iteration non-blocking/capped.

gossipsub-topics-unbounded-growth-poc.tar.gz

Affected Software

1 affected componentFixes available
npm/@libp2p/gossipsub<17.0.0
17.0.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/@libp2p/gossipsub to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 17.0.0
  2. Configuration

    Configure `allowedTopics` to deny topics that are not explicitly allowed, rather than leaving it unset.

    js-libp2p gossipsub allowedTopics = deny-by-default
  3. Compensating control

    Add a global cap on the gossipsub topics map size (`topics.size`).

  4. Compensating control

    Add a per-peer subscription cap and a P7 behaviour penalty so peers that exceed it are eventually greylisted by `acceptFrom`.

  5. Compensating control

    Enforce a topic-string length cap when decoding subscriptions in `decodeRpc`.

  6. Compensating control

    Make `removePeer`'s iteration over topic entries non-blocking or capped.

Event History

Nov 17, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·09:06 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·09:06 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Contact

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