GHSA-xgh8-jp6q-p5x8: Pip/Pillow vulnerability

============================================================================ ReDoS in XbmImagePlugin: 512-byte file stalls Image.open() for minutes Location: src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py:58 in XbmImageFile.open() Commit: a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6 ============================================================================

A crafted 512-byte file makes Pillow's Image.open() spend about six minutes of processor time on one core before it gives up with UnidentifiedImageError. Anyone who can hand bytes to an application that opens images with Pillow's default settings can trigger this, for example through an upload form, a thumbnailer, or a service that checks whether a blob is an image. A few such files sent at once can tie up a typical pool of worker processes.

The cause is the xbmhead regular expression in src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py:32-40, which XbmImageFile.open() (line 58) runs over the first 512 bytes of any stream whose prefix starts with #define. Several adjacent parts of the pattern can match the same characters. [ \t]+ overlaps with . in the width and height lines and with [^] in the optional hotspot lines, and [\r\n]+ closing the hotspot group overlaps with the following [\000-\377]. The header sets a run of k spaces after each #define and a run of k line terminators after yhot, then omits the [] after bits. That forces Python's backtracking matcher to try every way of splitting those runs and rescan the remaining bytes each time. The cost grows roughly as k to the fifth power: k = 60 measured 375 s, while a well-formed XBM of the same size opens in about 40 ms. Because this happens before any format is identified, none of Pillow's size, pixel-count or decompression-bomb limits apply, and upload size limits do not help because the file is tiny. ImageFile.Parser.feed() repeats the cost on every chunk until the stream is identified. The only existing mitigation is passing a formats= allowlist that excludes "XBM".

The attached reproducer opens the same header with and without the trailing []. The valid version opens as XBM in 52 ms. The broken version takes 0.1 s, 0.75 s, 3.0 s and 8.6 s at k = 10, 15, 20 and 25, and the slow k = 60 case is not run. This is the same class of bug as CVE-2021-25292 in PdfParser, but in a different plugin and reachable from plain Image.open().

Details

XbmImageFile.open() identifies an XBM file by running the module-level regex xbmhead over the first 512 bytes of the stream. The pattern has several adjacent quantifier pairs that can consume the same characters, followed by a [\000-\377]bits\[] tail that rescans the rest of the buffer for every way of splitting them. A 512-byte input built to exercise all of them and then fail the final literal keeps Image.open() in xbmhead.match() for minutes before it raises UnidentifiedImageError.

This 512-byte input (k = 60) takes 375 s of CPU in Image.open(io.BytesIO(data)) with default settings, measured on the stock build at this commit:

python k = 60 data = b"#define" + b" "k + b"width 1\r" data += b"#define" + b" "k + b"height 1\r" data += b"#define" + b" "k + b"xhot 1\r" data += b"#define" + b" "k + b"yhot 1" + b"\r"k data += b"bits" # no "[]": the final literal never matches data += b"A" (512 - len(data)) # pad to the 512 bytes open() reads

Calling XbmImagePlugin.xbmhead.match(data) directly gives the same picture: k = 10 → 0.11 s, k = 15 → 0.76 s, k = 20 → 3.0 s, k = 25 → 8.5 s, k = 30 → 19.9 s (roughly ×27 per doubling of k, i.e. about k^4.7). A well-formed 512-byte XBM matches in 10 µs and opens and loads through Image.open() in ~40 ms including plugin import; the same k = 60 header with bits[] present matches in 5 µs.

The regex, src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py:32:

python xbmhead = re.compile( rb"\s#define[ \t]+.width[ \t]+(?P<width>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" b"#define[ \t]+.height[ \t]+(?P<height>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" b"(?P<hotspot>" b"#define[ \t]+[^]xhot[ \t]+(?P<xhot>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" b"#define[ \t]+[^]yhot[ \t]+(?P<yhot>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" b")?" rb"[\000-\377]bits\[]" )

and the only call site, src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py:58:

python def open(self) -> None: … m = xbmhead.match(self.fp.read(512)) if not m: msg = "not a XBM file" raise SyntaxError(msg)

For a well-formed header (#define imwidth 8\n…static char imbits[] = {) each [ \t]+ eats the single space, ./[^] eat the identifier prefix, and [\000-\377]bits\[] finds the literal on its first backward scan, so the match is linear. The crafted header diverges at every one of those points:

- [ \t]+.width and [ \t]+.height: the run of k spaces after #define can be split between [ \t]+ and . in k ways, all leading to the same continuation. Factor k each. (The choice of \r terminators is incidental: the same header with \n terminators is equally slow.) - [ \t]+[^]xhot and [ \t]+[^]yhot inside the optional hotspot group: [^] also matches spaces, so the same k-way split exists twice more. Factor k each. These two lines are essential: without them the same input is rejected in about 10 ms. - [\r\n]+ closing the hotspot group, followed by )? and [\000-\377]: the run of k \r bytes after yhot 1 can be divided between [\r\n]+ and [\000-\377] in k ways. Factor k. - [\000-\377]bits\[]: for every combination above, the engine swallows the remaining ~150 bytes of padding and walks back looking for bits[]. The input contains bits but never [], so this always fails and every combination is visited.

CPython's re is a backtracking engine without memoisation, so the total work is on the order of k^5 × (512 − header length) steps — about 10^11 for k = 60, consistent with the measured 375 s. The 512-byte read caps k (5k + ~60 ≤ 512), so the cost per open() is bounded, but the bound is minutes of CPU.

The path is the default one. Image.open() (src/PIL/Image.py:3719) reads a 16-byte prefix and offers it to every registered plugin's accept hook; XbmImagePlugin.accept() (src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py:43) returns true for anything whose left-stripped prefix starts with #define, and open() then runs the regex. No size, pixel-count or decompression-bomb check can apply before this point because nothing has been parsed yet, and since the match ultimately fails the file is never identified, so the only outcome for the caller is UnidentifiedImageError after the delay. File name and extension are irrelevant because dispatch is by content. A faulthandler stack dump taken 20 s into the call shows the interpreter at XbmImagePlugin.py:58 in open ← ImageFile.py:154 in init ← Image.py:3699 in opencore ← Image.py:3719 in open.

ImageFile.Parser.feed() (src/PIL/ImageFile.py:584) amplifies this further: until the stream is identified it calls Image.open() on all accumulated data at every feed(), so an application feeding the stream in chunks pays the regex cost once per chunk (measured: k = 15 header fed in 8 chunks → 4.6 s versus 0.76 s for a single open()).

Impact

Anyone who can get 512 bytes in front of Image.open() — an upload endpoint, thumbnailer, or any service that uses Pillow to sniff whether a blob is an image — pins one CPU core of the handling process for roughly six minutes per request with the default plugin set and default limits. Nothing large is allocated and no DecompressionBombWarning/Error fires; application-side upload size limits do not help because the file is tiny, and Image.MAXIMAGEPIXELS is never consulted because no image is ever identified. A handful of concurrent requests is enough to exhaust a typical worker pool. The per-call cost is bounded by the 512-byte header read, so this is a CPU-exhaustion denial of service of the handling process rather than an infinite loop. Applications that pass an explicit formats= allowlist to Image.open() that excludes "XBM" are not affected.

This is the same bug class as CVE-2021-25292 (catastrophic backtracking in the PdfParser regexes, fixed in 8.1.1) and CVE-2021-23437 (ImageColor.getrgb ReDoS, fixed in 8.3.2), in a different plugin; unlike the PDF case it is reached from plain Image.open() on any byte stream.

Reproducing

repro is a single Python script. It uses the installed Pillow through the public Image.open() API and needs no rebuild.

Each input is the 512-byte header from Details: four #define lines with k spaces after #define, lines ending in \r, k \r bytes after yhot 1, padding with A up to the 512 bytes that open() reads. The only thing that changes between inputs is the tail: bits[] (valid) or bits (the final literal can never match).

1. Control. Opens the k = 60 header with the tail bits[]. The regex matches on its first try and Pillow reports XBM (1, 1) in about 50 ms. This shows that the same bytes are only slow when the match has to fail. 2. Attack. Opens the header with the tail bits at k = 10, 15, 20 and 25. Each one raises UnidentifiedImageError, after about 0.1 s, 0.75 s, 3.0 s and 8.6 s. The time grows polynomially, not linearly. The k = 60 input from Details, which takes about 6 minutes of CPU, is not run.

Expected output on this commit:

control k=60 'bits[]': XBM (1, 1) in 0.052s attack k=10 'bits' : UnidentifiedImageError in 0.105s attack k=15 'bits' : UnidentifiedImageError in 0.748s attack k=20 'bits' : UnidentifiedImageError in 3.024s attack k=25 'bits' : UnidentifiedImageError in 8.561s BUG

The script prints BUG only when all of these hold:

- the control header opened as XBM in under 1 s; - the k = 25 attack input took more than 2 s; - the k = 25 attack input took more than 5 times as long as the k = 15 one, i.e. the cost grows super-linearly in k.

Otherwise it prints OK. With the attached patch applied, every attack input is rejected at once, so the script prints OK.

Suggested fix

The attached patch removes the overlap between [ \t]+ and the quantifier that matches the identifier prefix in xbmhead (src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py:32-40), so the whitespace after #define can be consumed in exactly one way and the identifier cannot run across line terminators. It matches the identifier with [^ \t\r\n] (and [^ \t\r\n] in the hotspot group, which keeps the existing "no underscore before xhot/yhot" behaviour); the remaining quantifier pairs are then either over disjoint character classes or reduce to a single linear rescan of at most 512 bytes:

diff xbmhead = re.compile( - rb"\s#define[ \t]+.width[ \t]+(?P<width>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" - b"#define[ \t]+.height[ \t]+(?P<height>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" + rb"\s#define[ \t]+[^ \t\r\n]width[ \t]+(?P<width>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" + rb"#define[ \t]+[^ \t\r\n]height[ \t]+(?P<height>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" b"(?P<hotspot>" - b"#define[ \t]+[^]xhot[ \t]+(?P<xhot>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" - b"#define[ \t]+[^]yhot[ \t]+(?P<yhot>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" + rb"#define[ \t]+[^ \t\r\n]xhot[ \t]+(?P<xhot>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" + rb"#define[ \t]+[^ \t\r\n]yhot[ \t]+(?P<yhot>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" b")?" rb"[\000-\377]bits\[]" )

This mirrors the PdfParser fix for CVE-2021-25292. The patch also adds a testredos case to Tests/testfilexbm.py, in the style of the one in Tests/testfilepdf.py: it builds the k = 60 header from Details and, under @timeoutunlessslowervalgrind(1), expects XbmImageFile to raise SyntaxError. With the patch applied to a clean checkout and rebuilt, the reproducer prints OK and the existing Tests/testfilexbm.py (including hopper.xbm, hopperunderscore.xbm and the hotspot round-trip) still passes. The change does reject headers whose identifier contains whitespace (#define foo barwidth 16), which is not valid C and is not produced by Pillow's own XBM writer.

The patch

Use more specific regex chars in the XBM header regex to prevent ReDoS in Image.open() on a crafted 512-byte header

Applies to src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py at the commit above.

diff diff --git a/Tests/testfilexbm.py b/Tests/testfilexbm.py index 1988c417f..67236c795 100644 --- a/Tests/testfilexbm.py +++ b/Tests/testfilexbm.py @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import pytest from PIL import Image, XbmImagePlugin -from .helper import hopper +from .helper import hopper, timeoutunlessslowervalgrind TYPECHECKING = False if TYPECHECKING: @@ -91,3 +91,17 @@ def testhotspot(tmppath: Path) -> None: with Image.open(out) as reloaded: assert reloaded.info["hotspot"] == hotspot + + +@timeoutunlessslowervalgrind(1) +def testredos() -> None: + k = 60 + malicious = b"#define" + b" " k + b"width 1\r" + malicious += b"#define" + b" " k + b"height 1\r" + malicious += b"#define" + b" " k + b"xhot 1\r" + malicious += b"#define" + b" " k + b"yhot 1" + b"\r" k + b"bits" + malicious += b"A" (512 - len(malicious)) + + # The important thing is it doesn't timeout, cause a ReDoS + with pytest.raises(SyntaxError): + XbmImagePlugin.XbmImageFile(BytesIO(malicious)) diff --git a/src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py b/src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py index 95729d73d..7435d20f2 100644 --- a/src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py +++ b/src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py @@ -29,12 +29,14 @@ if TYPECHECKING: from typing import IO # XBM header +# The identifier before each suffix cannot contain whitespace, so that it +# cannot overlap with the preceding [ \t]+ and cause a ReDoS xbmhead = re.compile( - rb"\s#define[ \t]+.width[ \t]+(?P<width>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" - b"#define[ \t]+.height[ \t]+(?P<height>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" + rb"\s#define[ \t]+[^ \t\r\n]width[ \t]+(?P<width>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" + rb"#define[ \t]+[^ \t\r\n]height[ \t]+(?P<height>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" b"(?P<hotspot>" - b"#define[ \t]+[^]xhot[ \t]+(?P<xhot>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" - b"#define[ \t]+[^]yhot[ \t]+(?P<yhot>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" + rb"#define[ \t]+[^ \t\r\n]xhot[ \t]+(?P<xhot>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" + rb"#define[ \t]+[^ \t\r\n]yhot[ \t]+(?P<yhot>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" b")?" rb"[\000-\377]bits\[]" )

The reproducer

<details> <summary>Reproducer — <code>repro</code>, 1,138 bytes (click to open)</summary>

Its last line is BUG when the issue triggers and OK when it does not. Re-run on a clean build of that commit it printed BUG.

python #!/usr/bin/env python3 XbmImagePlugin.xbmhead catastrophic backtracking, reached from Image.open() on a <=512-byte stream. Prints BUG if a failing 512-byte header takes super-linearly long while the same-shaped valid header opens instantly. import io, time from PIL import Image

def hdr(k, tail): d = b"" for name in (b"width 1\r", b"height 1\r", b"xhot 1\r", b"yhot 1"): d += b"#define" + b" " k + name d += b"\r" k + tail return d + b"A" (512 - len(d))

def timed(data): s = time.perfcounter() try: im = Image.open(io.BytesIO(data)); r = f"{im.format} {im.size}" except Exception as e: r = type(e).name return r, time.perfcounter() - s

ctl, tc = timed(hdr(60, b"bits[]")) print(f"control k=60 'bits[]': {ctl} in {tc:.3f}s") ts = {} for k in (10, 15, 20, 25): r, ts[k] = timed(hdr(k, b"bits")) print(f"attack k={k:2d} 'bits' : {r} in {ts[k]:.3f}s", flush=True) k=60 (fits easily in 512 bytes) runs for minutes; not executed here. bug = ctl.startswith("XBM") and tc < 1 and ts[25] > 2 and ts[25] > 5 ts[15] print("BUG" if bug else "OK") </details>

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