GHSL-2026-225: Artifact metadata injection in actions/attest
The commit-dist.yml workflow trusts an artifact-supplied branch name. An external contributor can exploit this trust boundary violation to push attacker-controlled dist/ content to a target repository branch.
Other sources
The commit-dist.yml workflow in the actions/attest project improperly trusts an artifact-supplied branch name. This allows attackers to compromise the workflow and push attacker-controlled dist/ content to a branch of their choosing, potentially affecting repository integrity.
— GitHub Security Lab
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit this issue?
An external contributor can exploit it if they can provide an artifact whose metadata includes an attacker-controlled branch name.
What must be present for exploitation to succeed?
The target must use the commit-dist.yml workflow and trust the artifact-supplied branch name when deciding where to push dist/ content. The attacker needs a way to supply the relevant artifact metadata through the workflow's trust boundary.
What is the likely impact of successful exploitation?
Successful exploitation allows attacker-controlled dist/ content to be pushed to a target repository branch.