GO-2025-3743: CoreDNS Vulnerable to DoQ Memory Exhaustion via Stream Amplification
CoreDNS is a DNS server that chains plugins. In versions prior to 1.12.2, a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the CoreDNS DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) server implementation. The server previously created a new goroutine for every incoming QUIC stream without imposing any limits on the number of concurrent streams or goroutines. A remote, unauthenticated attacker could open a large number of streams, leading to uncontrolled memory consumption and eventually causing an Out Of Memory (OOM) crash — especially in containerized or memory-constrained environments. The patch in version 1.12.2 introduces two key mitigation mechanisms: maxstreams, which caps the number of concurrent QUIC streams per connection with a default value of 256; and workerpoolsize, which Introduces a server-wide, bounded worker pool to process incoming streams with a default value of 1024. This eliminates the 1:1 stream-to-goroutine model and ensures that CoreDNS remains resilient under high concurrency. Some workarounds are available for those who are unable to upgrade. Disable QUIC support by removing or commenting out the quic:// block in the Corefile, use container runtime resource limits to detect and isolate excessive memory usage, and/or monitor QUIC connection patterns and alert on anomalies.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
CoreDNSto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.12.2 - Configuration
Disable QUIC support by removing or commenting out the quic:// block in the Corefile.
CoreDNS QUIC support = disabled - Compensating control
Use container runtime resource limits to detect and isolate excessive memory usage.
- Compensating control
Monitor QUIC connection patterns and alert on anomalies.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this denial-of-service condition?
CoreDNS versions earlier than 1.12.2 are exposed when their Corefile enables DNS-over-QUIC with a quic:// block. Containerized or otherwise memory-constrained deployments are especially susceptible to an OOM crash.
What does an attacker need to exploit this issue?
An attacker only needs remote network access to the affected DoQ service. No authentication, privileges, or user interaction are required; the attacker can open many QUIC streams to consume memory.
How can I determine whether an instance needs remediation?
Check whether CoreDNS is running a version earlier than 1.12.2 and whether its Corefile contains an enabled quic:// block. Both conditions indicate that the vulnerable DoQ implementation may be in use.
What can be done if upgrading is not immediately possible?
Disable QUIC support by removing or commenting out the quic:// block in the Corefile. Container runtime resource limits can also reduce the impact of uncontrolled memory consumption.
What protections are added in version 1.12.2?
Version 1.12.2 limits concurrent QUIC streams per connection through max_streams, defaulting to 256, and processes streams through a bounded server-wide worker pool. The worker_pool_size default is 1024, replacing the prior one-goroutine-per-stream behavior.