GO-2025-4174: gokey allows secret recovery from a seed file without the master password
In gokey versions <0.2.0, a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly being derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM authentication tag of the key seed.
This issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version 0.2.0 gokey will generate different secrets.
Impact This vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the -s option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the -s option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is also not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). Specific impact includes:
keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it was expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 bytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was used
a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated from a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without the knowledge of the seed master password
Patches The code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0 and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions will produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed entropy will be used now.
System secret rotation guidance It is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (0.2.0 and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems in place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is system-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.
Systems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation Such systems usually have a "Forgot password" facility or a similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by sending a unique "magic" link to the user's email or phone. In such cases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly generated password secret, when prompted by the system.
Systems that require the old password/secret for rotation Such systems usually have a modal password rotation window usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the old and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To generate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:
temporarily download gokey version 0.1.3 https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3 for their respective operating system to recover the old password
use gokey version 0.2.0 or above to generate the new password
populate the system provided password rotation form
Systems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned Such systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic key as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the same time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several authorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such systems users are advised to:
generate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version 0.2.0 or above
provision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system
verify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential
revoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system
Credit This vulnerability was found by Théo Cusnir ( @mistermime https://hackerone.com/mistermime ) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare's bug bounty program.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 0.2.0 - Operational
For credentials derived from a seed file, temporarily use gokey version 0.1.3 to recover the old password when the system requires it; generate the replacement with gokey version 0.2.0 or above, provision it alongside the existing credential, verify access or required operations with the new credential, then revoke the old credential.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which generated secrets are affected?
Only keys and secrets generated with a seed file supplied through the -s option are affected. Secrets generated from the master password alone, without -s, are not impacted.
What would an attacker need to recover affected passwords?
An attacker would need possession of the seed file. In affected versions, they could recover passwords generated from that seed without knowing the master password.
Does this expose the seed file itself?
No. The confidentiality of the seed itself is not impacted, and the seed is not required to regenerate the seed itself.
What changes after upgrading to version 0.2.0?
The fix is a breaking change: secrets derived using -s will change even when the same seed file is used. Previously derived passwords or secrets are invalidated and must be regenerated or updated where they are used.