HSEC-2026-0015: Missing validation of CONNECT requests in http2
Missing validation of CONNECT requests in http2
For CONNECT requests, checkRequestHeader (Network/HTTP2/H2/HPACK.hs) in http2 up to 5.4.13 returned early, only requiring the absence of :scheme and :path. Every other check was skipped:
the requirement that :authority is present (RFC 9113, Section 8.5); the check that :authority and Host agree, which applies to every other request (RFC 9113, Section 8.3.1: a server SHOULD treat a mismatch as malformed); the common checks for :status, Connection and TE.
A CONNECT request carrying :authority: a.example and Host: b.example was therefore accepted. Consumers that read Host see b.example where intermediaries that read :authority see a.example. warp, for example, sets requestHeaderHost to Host when present and falls back to :authority, so an application behind an intermediary that routes or authorizes on :authority handles a request other than the one the intermediary validated — a request can be smuggled past the front-end's access control, validation, logging or WAF rules.
Exploitation requires a front-end that makes decisions based on :authority while the application behind it bases routing or authorization on Host; a directly exposed server sees only one authority.
A CONNECT request with neither :authority nor :path also passed validation and reached warp 3.4.21, where fromJust (mPath <|> mAuth) (Network/Wai/Handler/Warp/HTTP2/Request.hs) threw. The exception was raised in the stream's worker thread, so it reset one stream and did not affect the server process.
Resolution
http2 5.4.14 validates CONNECT requests like every other request: :authority is required, :scheme and :path are forbidden, and the common checks apply, including the :authority/Host consistency check. A malformed request is rejected with a stream error of type PROTOCOLERROR, leaving the connection itself in place. With every request thus carrying :path or :authority when it reaches warp, the fromJust can no longer fail, so warp needs no change.
The same release also stops the server from pushing on a request that has no :scheme or :authority, where a push previously crashed on the missing :scheme.
Upgrade to http2 5.4.14 or later. Series before 4.0 performed no :authority/Host consistency check at all, for any request, and are unsupported; upgrade regardless.
Credits
Reported by Akash Sebastian (@akashseb). Validated and fixed by Kazu Yamamoto.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
hackage/http2to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 5.4.14 - Upgrade
Upgrade
http2to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 5.4.14
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are realistically exposed?
Exposure requires an HTTP/2 front end or intermediary that routes, authorizes, validates, logs, or applies WAF rules using :authority, with a backend application that uses Host instead. The described Warp behavior uses Host when it is present and only falls back to :authority.
What must an attacker send to exploit the issue?
The attacker needs to send a CONNECT request with conflicting :authority and Host values, such as :authority set to a.example and Host set to b.example. The vulnerable validation accepted this mismatch while requiring only that :scheme and :path were absent.
How can I determine whether a deployment is affected?
Check whether it uses http2 version 5.4.13 or earlier and accepts HTTP/2 CONNECT requests. Then verify whether any front end makes security or routing decisions from :authority while the backend uses Host; this split interpretation is the condition described for request smuggling.