HSEC-2026-0016: Improper IP address validation in validateCertificateName
Improper IP address validation in validateCertificateName
Data.X509.Validation.getNames extracts only AltNameDNS entries from the subjectAltName extension (Data/X509/Validation.hs, unAltName, ~L512–515 in crypton-x509-validation 1.10.1). When a certificate carries an iPAddress SAN but no dNSName SAN, the extracted name list is empty, so validateNames (~L569–580) falls through to the commonName branch as if no SAN extension existed, even though the extension's haddock promises that the commonName is ignored whenever subjectAltName is present. Consequently, when a client connects to an IP literal:
a certificate with CN = <target IP> but iPAddress SAN pointing to a different host is accepted; a certificate whose only valid identity is a matching iPAddress SAN is rejected.
Exploitation requires a certificate from a CA the client trusts that has a commonName different from its iPAddress SAN (public CAs are barred from this by the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements, but private or enterprise CAs can issue such certificates). A successful impersonation exposes and can modify the protected connection.
The draft fix makes getNames distinguish "no SAN extension" from "SAN extension present with no DNS names" and applies SAN semantics (including the existing iPAddress comparison) whenever the extension is present, restoring the documented SAN-supersedes-CN behavior in line with RFC 9525. No fixed release is published at the time of writing (1.10.1 is the latest release and still vulnerable).
Credits
Reported by Dickson Wu (SEAL & CertiK). Validated and fixed by Kazu Yamamoto.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
hackage/crypton-x509-validationto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.10.2