MAL-2026-17447: Malicious code in mikuhostt-baileys (npm)

Published Nov 16, 2026
·
Updated

This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the "PhantomSub" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp w:mex FOLLOW query (queryid 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID.

package/lib/Defaults/index.js lines 78-80 ship the defaults autoFollowNewsletterOnConnect: true, autoFollowNewsletterDelayMs: 90000 and autoFollowNewsletterJid: "120363400911374213@newsletter" (a plain string literal, repeated as the fallback constant at package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js line 11). package/lib/Socket/index.js line 11 calls triggerAutoFollow (newsletter.js line 428) on every socket; 90 seconds after the connection opens, runAutoFollow (line 66) sends a raw w:mex IQ with queryid: QueryIds.FOLLOW (line 96) for that JID, retrying up to three times. The README lists "Auto-follow" only as a feature in a comparison table; it does not say that the library follows the publisher's channel by default.

Line numbers refer to version 1.0.2; the same code is present in every published version listed under affected.

Static review of the published tarball(s) found no code that sends WhatsApp credentials or session keys off-host, no install-time payload (the only install hook is Baileys' stock Node.js version check in engine-requirements.js), and no persistence; the payload runs when an application creates a WhatsApp socket with the library. The harm is the covert use of the victim's account to inflate the publisher's channel subscribers.

SHA-256 of the published npm tarball(s): 1.0.0: ae25a50a962aa412cc1b5dcccff38a2e6afb992f4866134f8aa40c2725dffd8c; 1.0.1: 4a5936d4a37e16ccf40ff141e45f316d65a3758247b68c91c8c7031541c11f3c; 1.0.2: 3e3e234f570aa598f9f77cc55fa874a65e4f966421660506d5d6b02a174a31d2.

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Source: ghsa-malware (2bfe3ed67f02b97f09c35ee1f8fcd25298d2c35594854b475da4b1efbd7c7e28) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Affected Software

1 affected component
npm/mikuhostt-baileys*

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Remove

    Remove npm/mikuhostt-baileys from your environment.

    Remove the mikuhostt-baileys package; removing it may not remove all malicious software resulting from its installation.

  2. Operational

    Rotate all secrets and keys stored on the affected computer immediately, using a different computer.

Event History

Nov 16, 2026
Advisory Published
via OSV·05:03 PM
Data Sourced
via OSV·05:03 PM
DescriptionAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who is exposed to the unwanted channel subscription?

Any application that installs this package and opens a WhatsApp socket using an authenticated installer or application WhatsApp session is exposed. The action is performed through that authenticated session, not through a separate attacker-controlled account.

2

Is the behavior enabled by default?

Yes. The shipped defaults enable auto-follow, set a 90-second delay after the socket connection opens, and specify the publisher-selected newsletter JID 120363400911374213@newsletter.

3

What event triggers the subscription attempt?

The package calls the auto-follow routine on every socket. After the connection has been open for 90 seconds, it sends a WhatsApp w:mex FOLLOW query for the configured channel and retries up to three times.

4

How can I determine whether my deployment contains the malicious behavior?

Inspect package/lib/Defaults/index.js for autoFollowNewsletterOnConnect set to true and the configured newsletter JID, and inspect package/lib/Socket/index.js for a call to triggerAutoFollow. The follow request implementation is in package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js and uses the FOLLOW query ID 7871414976211147.

Contact

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