MAL-2026-17451: Malicious code in wailib (npm)

Published Nov 16, 2026
·
Updated

This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the "PhantomSub" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp w:mex FOLLOW query (queryid 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID.

package/lib/Socket/messages-recv.js lines 45-72 define a char-code decoder (qvnr) and use it to build two channel JIDs, 120363428355171197@newsletter and 120363425751417260@newsletter, and the method names newsletterFollow (pzha, cited line 62: const pzha = qvnr() and newsletterMute (wjcf, line 68), so neither the JIDs nor the method names appear in the source as text. Lines 1125-1140, in the connection.update handler, wait 30 seconds after the connection opens and then, for each JID, call sock[pzha to follow the channel and, 3 seconds later, sockwjcf to mute it, so the victim is not notified of the channel's posts. There is no opt-out. The README (Portuguese) states "Sem auto-follow de canais — removida a rotina que seguia canais automaticamente apos conectar" ("No channel auto-follow — the routine that followed channels automatically after connecting was removed"), which the shipped code contradicts. The code is derived from noxleyss (MAL-2026-17402), whose name it still uses in package/lib/Utils/generics.js.

Line numbers refer to version 1.0.0.

Static review of the published tarball(s) found no code that sends WhatsApp credentials or session keys off-host, no install-time payload (the only install hook is Baileys' stock Node.js version check in engine-requirements.js), and no persistence; the payload runs when an application creates a WhatsApp socket with the library. The harm is the covert use of the victim's account to inflate the publisher's channel subscribers.

SHA-256 of the published npm tarball(s): 1.0.0: e762bd70253081e1f523e929509e8bd5ff005feaaec6580f8f8b95ee84085920.

--- -= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: ghsa-malware (a69d8b906240a12db46ebf332e263c3dff74e00da46ea739b18d85780f9205f8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Affected Software

1 affected component
npm/wailib*

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Remove

    Remove npm/wailib from your environment.

    Remove the wailib package; removing it may not remove all malicious software resulting from its installation.

  2. Operational

    Rotate all secrets and keys stored on the affected computer immediately, using a different computer.

Event History

Nov 16, 2026
Advisory Published
via OSV·06:50 PM
Data Sourced
via OSV·06:50 PM
DescriptionAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What must be true for the unwanted channel subscriptions to occur?

The package must establish an authenticated WhatsApp connection. After the connection opens, the injected connection.update handler waits 30 seconds and uses that session to follow the embedded WhatsApp Channel identifiers.

2

Can the behavior be disabled through a package option or user choice?

No opt-out is described. The code performs the follow operations without asking the installer, then mutes the followed channels three seconds later.

3

How can I check whether the installed package contains this behavior?

Inspect package/lib/Socket/messages-recv.js. The reported code includes a char-code decoder named qvnr, constructs the newsletterFollow and newsletterMute method names, and schedules actions for 120363428355171197@newsletter and 120363425751417260@newsletter in the connection.update handler.

Contact

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