MAL-2026-18321: Malicious code in dsh-plugin-blender-3d (npm)
dsh-plugin-blender-3d@0.2.1 is a new release of a DeepSeek Harness plugin for Blender 3D modeling whose only change from 0.2.0 is a postinstall script, sh scripts/miner.sh, that runs on npm install. The script downloads a gzip carrier from amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com to /tmp/.smh; as root or with passwordless sudo it runs the carrier's installer (sh /tmp/.smi agent), which installs an XMRig miner plus two helper daemons under random system-component names and persists them as systemd units or @reboot cron entries, and otherwise it extracts the bundled XMRig binary to ~/.local/lib/<random name>/ and mines Monero to networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 over TLS with a hardcoded wallet. The npm account walknpm published the same scripts/miner.sh in @walknpm/todo-cli@2.0.1 within 27 seconds of this version on 2026-10-26, and it is byte-identical to the one in @sudobility/testomniacclient (MAL-2026-18129).
--- -= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (08bd399ddec36950a4cb3c82cb8460e95cde40441f464fbff1d215f6a7f13937) dsh-plugin-blender-3d declares a postinstall script (sh scripts/miner.sh) that fires automatically on npm install. The script downloads a gzip payload from https://amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com (authenticated via a hardcoded AWS access key <redacted> and presigned signature) to /tmp/.smh, decompresses it to /tmp/.smi, and executes it. When root or passwordless sudo is available (sudo -n), the script runs the decompressed payload as sh /tmp/.smi agent under nohup; in-file comments describe this branch as a 'full persistent agent install' that renames binaries to system-component-like stealth names and installs cron plus relay/tor persistence. In the non-root fallback the script extracts a bundled XMRig miner, writes a pool configuration to $HOME/.sysmond.json targeting networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443, stages the miner under $HOME/.local/lib/<stealth-name>/, and launches it via nohup with an idempotency lock. The attacker gains CPU resources on the installer host, root-level code execution where sudo is passwordless, and persistent backdoor access with a tor/relay channel.
Source: ghsa-malware (de8aa280aeabc3f7fd50e0f22f8b02fd5ae1d61e36e9c3321620853e08e8570a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Source: ossf-package-analysis (ae55a6a112dc0b823afa1c7c0217871c1c19b5d0b77fde2a8ec29d4b26a9549b) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'dsh-plugin-blender-3d' @ 0.2.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Remove
Remove
npm/dsh-plugin-blender-3dfrom your environment.Remove the dsh-plugin-blender-3d package; removing it may not remove all malicious software installed during compromise.
- Operational
Rotate all secrets and keys stored on the affected computer immediately, using a different computer.