MAL-2026-19108: Malicious code in raiden-baileys (npm)
Malicious package. raiden-baileys is a trojanized fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library (@whiskeysockets/baileys). on connection it issues an authenticated w:mex newsletter FOLLOW mutation (queryid 7871414976211147) that silently subscribes every victim to attacker-controlled WhatsApp channels — hardcoded newsletter JIDs: 120363407277177688@newsletter, 120363407702752541@newsletter, 120363411769951302@newsletter. Legitimate Baileys never hardcodes a channel JID or auto-follows on connect; all published versions are malicious.
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Source: amazon-inspector (b9372597423bda09fe5c3adc72b7ff804563626e2af777237b38d39563613de8) package.json declares the libsignal dependency as github:RahmadTenpoles/libsignal-node with no commit SHA, tag, or integrity hash. On npm install, this resolves to whatever the default branch of that personal GitHub repository currently contains, including any lifecycle scripts, and executes them on the installer's machine. The source is a personal account unrelated to the official libsignal publisher, and the repository owner can push new code at any time to retroactively change what every subsequent install runs. The declared dependency key equals the standard name libsignal, so the override silently substitutes a third-party fork for what would otherwise resolve from the registry — a dependency-confusion-shaped override. The package also presents itself as a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library (raiden-baileys), a lookalike naming pattern against the widely used @whiskeysockets/baileys family.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to the unauthorized channel subscriptions?
Any application using raiden-baileys that establishes a WhatsApp connection is exposed. The follow mutations are issued on connection, and all published versions are malicious.
Does exploitation require a user action or special library configuration?
No additional user action or configuration is described. The package silently sends authenticated newsletter FOLLOW mutations when it connects.
What are the affected WhatsApp newsletter identifiers?
The hardcoded targets are 120363407277177688@newsletter, 120363407702752541@newsletter, and 120363411769951302@newsletter.
Is installing the package itself also a supply-chain risk?
Yes. Its libsignal dependency points to a personal GitHub repository without a commit SHA, tag, or integrity hash, so npm install resolves the repository's current default branch. That repository can be changed later, and any lifecycle scripts it contains can execute on the installer's machine.
Is there a known safe published version to use as a temporary workaround?
No. The available data states that all published versions are malicious.