MAL-2026-19952: Malicious code in usdm-minting-client (PyPI)
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Source: amazon-inspector (b1ae99636d7eb86ee7c8000ddb08003dd3f5613af27581e668fe12d783b0d665) The package is a dependency-confusion lure targeting internal USDm/Utila minting tooling. setup.py defines an exfil() routine that runs both at module import time and inside a custom install cmdclass, so it fires on pip install as well as any sdist build. exfil() reads wallet and cloud secrets from environment variables (PRIVATEKEY, MNEMONIC, USDMPRIVATEKEY, AWSSECRETACCESSKEY, GOOGLEAPPLICATIONCREDENTIALS, UTILASAPRIVATEKEY and similar), reads.env files from the current working directory and $HOME, and recursively collects.pem/.key/.json/.yaml files under ~/.utila and ~/.config/utila. The collected material is JSON-encoded and POSTed via urllib.request.urlopen to a hardcoded destination, https://webhook.site/ec3e3cb9-4cc1-4cb8-a273-4811768a631d (overridable via COLLECTORURL). The top-level usdmmintingclient/init.py repeats the exfiltration on every import usdmmintingclient, sending USDMPRIVATEKEY, PRIVATEKEY, MNEMONIC, USDMRPCURL and the contents of ~/.env and ~/.usdm.env to the same collector endpoint. A header comment in setup.py self-describes the package as a dependency-confusion PoC impersonating an internal usdm-minting-client, and the metadata uses a placeholder homepage (example.com) with a free-mail author address, consistent with a lure rather than a legitimate release.
Source: kam193 (78ca43ab87b214f4da683e6b9f171e762e4956e6db3210796b6ed8bc92e92e72) During installation the package exfiltrates credential files and environment variables, focusing on cryptocurrency- and cloud-related entries. The package seems to be targeting users of a package from GitHub (https://github.com/ethena-labs/usdm-minting-client) which has not been published to PyPI.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-11-usdm-minting-client
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
- exfiltration-env-variables
- crypto-related
- exfiltration-crypto
- exfiltration-credentials
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What actions can trigger the malicious code?
The exfiltration routine runs during pip installation and during source-distribution builds. It also runs whenever usdm_minting_client is imported.
What data may be exposed on an affected machine?
The package collects wallet and cloud credentials from environment variables, including private keys, mnemonics, AWS secrets, Google application credentials, and Utila service-account keys. It also reads .env files from the working directory and home directory and recursively collects .pem, .key, .json, and .yaml files under ~/.utila and ~/.config/utila.
Where is collected data sent, and can that destination differ?
Collected material is JSON-encoded and sent by HTTP POST to https://webhook.site/ec3e3cb9-4cc1-4cb8-a273-4811768a631d. The destination can be overridden through the COLLECTOR_URL environment variable.
How can an organization determine whether secrets may have been exposed?
Treat systems that installed, built, or imported the package as potentially exposed if they contained the targeted environment variables or relevant files in the listed locations. Review dependency and build records for the package and inspect outbound network activity for requests to the specified webhook.site endpoint; also check whether COLLECTOR_URL was set.