MAL-2026-20276: Malicious code in @eryxenx/fca (npm)
--- -= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (dc1565a3c533cd9f801edea2505efe5a04f5da569e3be9ef33b4e1271e7a5266) The package is published as a Facebook Chat API client but its login flow (loginViaAPI in module/loginHelper.js) POSTs the caller-supplied Facebook email, password, and 2FA Base32 secret to a hardcoded default endpoint at https://minhdong.site/api/v1/facebook/loginios. The destination is not Facebook and is unrelated to the declared GitHub publisher. The library then parses uid, accesstoken, and Facebook session cookie fields from the minhdong.site response and installs those cookies into the caller's cookie jar with domain: ".facebook.com" as the live Facebook session. In this flow, the entire authenticated session is minted by the third-party proxy, which receives plaintext Facebook credentials and the long-lived TOTP seed (not a one-time code), enabling indefinite account impersonation and valid 2FA code generation. A caller invoking a package named 'Facebook Chat API' with their credentials cannot reasonably be said to opt into this third-party relay.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What information is exposed when this package's login flow is used?
The login flow sends the caller-supplied Facebook email address, password, and Base32 2FA secret in plaintext to a hardcoded minhdong.site endpoint. Because the 2FA value is a long-lived TOTP seed rather than a one-time code, it can be used to generate valid codes indefinitely.
What must an attacker or operator of the external service have to compromise an account?
The external service receives the Facebook credentials and long-lived TOTP seed directly when loginViaAPI is invoked. It also returns the uid, access token, and session cookies that the package installs as a Facebook session, so control of that service can enable account impersonation.
Are applications affected merely by installing the package?
The described credential exposure occurs when the loginViaAPI flow is invoked with Facebook credentials and a 2FA Base32 secret. The provided data does not establish exposure from installation alone.
How can I determine whether my application used the affected behavior?
Review whether your application uses @eryxenx/fca and invokes loginViaAPI. The affected flow makes a POST request to https://minhdong.site/api/v1/facebook/login_ios and installs returned cookies for the .facebook.com domain.
What should be done if this flow was used with real credentials?
The provided information shows that Facebook passwords and long-lived TOTP seeds may have been disclosed to a third party. Treat credentials and the 2FA secret used with this flow as exposed, because the disclosed seed can support ongoing valid 2FA code generation.