MAL-2026-20281: Malicious code in spencer-braincore (npm)
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Source: amazon-inspector (4ec1d797117854b43cd4c33034a339b7590515ddebf4b1aabaa3b11b9a693814) spencer-braincore is a Baileys-derived WhatsApp library whose makeNewsletterSocket schedules an unconditional timer (90s after connect, repeating every 3 hours) that fetches a JSON list from the hardcoded endpoint https://savage-prox.onrender.com/api/v1/links and uses the consumer's authenticated WhatsApp session to invoke groupAcceptInvite for each returned invite code and the newsletter-follow IQ for each returned channel id. The destination is not caller-configurable and the behavior fires on any normal use of the advertised makeWASocket entrypoint, so the installer's WhatsApp identity is silently used to join groups and follow channels chosen by the author on a remotely mutable list. The published tarball also ships a .bak sibling containing the same auto-follow loop with the endpoint base64-encoded (decoding to https://files.gifted.co.ke/file/chJids.json), indicating the destination was previously concealed. The covert action uses the installer's authenticated identity, but there is no credential theft, filesystem persistence, remote code execution, or destruction.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to the unauthorized actions?
Applications that use the advertised makeWASocket entrypoint and connect with an authenticated WhatsApp session are exposed. The behavior runs during normal socket use and acts as the installer's WhatsApp identity.
What does an attacker need to control to cause unwanted group joins or channel follows?
The actor controlling the hardcoded remote JSON endpoint can supply invite codes and channel IDs. The package then processes those values using the consumer's authenticated session without requiring the destination to be configured by the caller.
Does this require an unusual or opt-in configuration?
No. The timer is scheduled unconditionally after connection and fires approximately 90 seconds later, then repeats every three hours, when using the normal advertised entrypoint.
How can responders look for evidence that this behavior occurred?
Review network activity for requests to savage-prox.onrender.com/api/v1/links and inspect the WhatsApp account for unexpected group memberships or followed newsletters. The published tarball also contains a .bak file with a similar loop that references a base64-encoded endpoint decoding to files.gifted.co.ke/file/chJids.json.