MAL-2026-20284: Malicious code in @iky-erza/baileys (npm)
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Source: amazon-inspector (967763a0fcb8295a6cee58761594b585651571a5be455f106435bc70aa59b400) package.json declares the runtime dependency libsignal as github:tenka-san/libsignal-node with no commit SHA, tag, or semver pin. On npm install, npm fetches whatever the repository's default branch HEAD currently points at and runs any lifecycle scripts inside it on the installer's machine, with no integrity check and no version pinning. Whoever controls that GitHub account can change the resolved code at any time without republishing this package, and installers running npm install @iky-erza/baileys will pick up the change on the next install. This is an off-registry, mutable dependency source — a different trust surface from the registry-published libsignal used by upstream Baileys. A separate static match on lib/Utils/generics.js corresponds to standard cross-platform ping dispatch for connectivity checks and is not by itself indicative of exfiltration.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Configuration
Pin `libsignal` (`github:tenka-san/libsignal-node`) to an immutable commit SHA instead of leaving it unpinned.
package.json libsignal dependency reference
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is exposed to this issue?
Systems that run npm install for @iky-erza/baileys are exposed, including developer workstations and build or deployment environments. The risk occurs when npm resolves the unpinned GitHub dependency libsignal from the repository's current default-branch HEAD.
What does an attacker need to exploit it?
An attacker would need control of the GitHub account or repository referenced as tenka-san/libsignal-node. They could change the default branch so that a later install retrieves altered code, including lifecycle scripts that run on the installer's machine.
Is a normal npm installation affected?
Yes. The package.json dependency uses a GitHub repository reference without a commit SHA, tag, semver pin, or integrity check, so npm install can fetch whatever code the repository's default branch points to at installation time.
What can be done if the package cannot immediately be removed or replaced?
Avoid fresh or repeated installations that resolve this dependency from the mutable GitHub default branch. Pin the dependency to a reviewed immutable commit SHA and review any lifecycle scripts before permitting installation in developer or automated environments.
How can I determine whether an environment may already be affected?
Review installations of @iky-erza/baileys and determine which revision npm retrieved for the GitHub-hosted libsignal dependency. Also inspect installation and build environments for lifecycle-script execution associated with that dependency.