MAL-2026-20287: Malicious code in @izi-coder/baileys (npm)
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Source: amazon-inspector (c476c49d67a7760e7893b185a53a3b9de7cc6c005b5480493eb82f66bde8bac1) This unofficial fork of Baileys declares a production dependency sourced directly from a GitHub repository with no commit pin: "libsignal": "github:Cogils/libsignal-node" in package.json. npm install resolves that source off-registry, fetches whatever the branch tip currently holds, and runs any lifecycle scripts inside it. The referenced repository is owned by a third party (Cogils), unrelated to the upstream WhiskeySockets/Baileys publisher, so whoever controls that repo controls code executed on the installer's machine at install time. The package also presents low-trust provenance: it is published under @izi-coder as an unofficial Baileys fork, the manifest's repository URL points at a Telegram channel rather than a source host, and lib/index.js prints a hostile ASCII banner and Telegram self-promo links on import.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is exposed to install-time code execution?
Any environment that runs npm install for @izi-coder/baileys may be exposed, including developer workstations and build or CI systems. Its production dependency is fetched directly from a third-party GitHub repository rather than the npm registry.
What would an attacker need to exploit this supply-chain risk?
An attacker would need control of the Cogils/libsignal-node repository or the source resolved at its current branch tip. Because no commit is pinned, npm can fetch whatever code that repository currently serves and run its lifecycle scripts during installation.
How can I determine whether this package is present?
Check project manifests and installed dependency trees or lockfiles for @izi-coder/baileys. The referenced package releases include 2.0.5, 6.0.9, and 6.0.10.