MAL-2026-20290: Malicious code in @fedfub/string-utils (npm)
Malicious package. Advertised as "String manipulation utilities", but the postinstall hook runs a minified self-propagating credential stealer, the same code as @fedfub/utils. On install it collects environment variables matching KEY/SECRET/TOKEN/PASS/AWS/JWT/STRIPE/PAYPAL/DB/DATABASE/REDIS/MONGO, source files under the working directory and the contents of ~/.ssh, and POSTs them to https://73.218.105.44:8080/collect. It then tries to republish itself under each dependency name of the host project as <name>-patch@99.0.0, adds a fedfub-utils dependency to every package.json under the home directory, persists with an @reboot crontab entry (or a SYSTEM onlogon scheduled task on Windows), and polls /cmd every 30 seconds, executing the returned command and posting the output to /result. In a sandboxed install the postinstall connected to 73.218.105.44. The package has since been removed from the npm registry.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What systems are exposed if this package was installed?
Any system where the package's postinstall hook ran is exposed, including developer workstations and build environments. The code collects matching environment-variable secrets, source files in the working directory, and the contents of ~/.ssh.
Does exploitation require the package to be imported or used by the application?
No. The malicious behavior is implemented in a postinstall hook, so it runs during installation. A sandboxed install was observed connecting to 73.218.105.44.
What attacker access could result from an installation?
The package posts collected data to its collection endpoint, attempts to persist at reboot or user logon, and polls a command endpoint every 30 seconds. Returned commands are executed and their output is posted back to the attacker.
What should be checked during incident triage?
Check for an @reboot crontab entry and, on Windows, a SYSTEM onlogon scheduled task. Also inspect package.json files under affected users' home directories for a fedfub-utils dependency and look for dependency-name packages suffixed with -patch at version 99.0.0.
Can this spread beyond the initially affected project?
Yes. It attempts to republish itself under each dependency name of the host project as <name>-patch@99.0.0, and it adds fedfub-utils to every package.json under the home directory.