MAL-2026-20291: Malicious code in @fedfub/utils (npm)

Published Nov 19, 2026
·
Updated

Malicious package. Advertised as "Utility helpers for Node.js", but the postinstall hook runs worm.js (also the package main), a self-propagating credential stealer. On install it collects every environment variable matching KEY/SECRET/TOKEN/PASS/AWS/JWT/STRIPE/PAYPAL/DB/DATABASE/REDIS/MONGO, up to 5000 characters of every source file under the working directory, and the contents of ~/.ssh, then POSTs them with hostname, username and platform to https://73.218.105.44:8080/collect. It then tries to republish itself under each dependency name of the host project as <name>-security-patch@99.0.0 via npm publish, injects itself into package.json files under the home directory, persists with an @reboot crontab entry (or a SYSTEM onlogon scheduled task on Windows), and polls /cmd every 30 seconds, executing whatever command the server returns and posting the output to /result. In a sandboxed install the postinstall connected to 73.218.105.44 and wrote the crontab entry. The package has since been removed from the npm registry. The same author published @fedfub/string-utils with a minified copy of the same code.

Affected Software

1 affected component
npm/@fedfub/utils=1.0.1

Event History

Nov 19, 2026
Advisory Published
via OSV·04:00 PM
Data Sourced
via OSV·04:00 PM
DescriptionAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who is exposed to this package?

Any environment that installed the package and allowed its postinstall script to run is exposed, including developer workstations, CI runners, and build systems. The package was also designed to modify package.json files under the user home directory and create persistence.

2

What does successful execution give an attacker?

The package collects matching secret-bearing environment variables, source-file contents, and ~/.ssh contents, then sends them with host metadata to the listed collection server. It also polls the server for commands every 30 seconds and executes returned commands, posting the output back.

3

Is an install enough to trigger the malicious behavior?

Yes. The malicious code is invoked through a postinstall hook, and the package main is also worm.js. A sandboxed installation connected to the collection server and wrote a crontab persistence entry.

4

What should be checked if this package was installed?

Check for unauthorized packages named <dependency>-security-patch at version 99.0.0, unexpected package.json modifications under user home directories, and an @reboot crontab entry or a Windows SYSTEM onlogon scheduled task. Treat environment variables, SSH material, and source content accessible during installation as potentially exfiltrated.

5

What can be done if immediate patching or removal is not possible?

Prevent the affected installation from running with access to secrets, SSH directories, source trees, npm publishing credentials, and outbound connectivity to the listed collection server. Rotate potentially exposed credentials and investigate any package publication activity, because the code attempts to republish itself using the host project's dependency names.

Contact

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