MAL-2026-20304: Malicious code in qzi2v-tttf1-testmetest (npm)
--- -= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (b99ca6a65bd9e71ec0333a05a272ad0b11773ca20630f9d02ad79345a64b8fdc) The package presents itself as a utility library but exports nothing (index.js is 188 bytes and only require()s a platform-specific native addon). Three precompiled native binaries are shipped (nativewin.node, nativemac.node, native.napi.node) alongside a 1,192,296-byte opaque .napicache blob with zero printable strings and no native source. Strings in the binaries show the addon reads .napicache, writes a staged JS file matching %s.nc%lu.js (Linux/mac also /tmp/.%u), and executes it via node "%s" using CreateProcessA on Windows and fork/execlp on Linux/mac. The loader is gated on CI environment variables (GITHUBACTIONS, GITLABCI, CIRCLECI, JENKINSURL, BUILDKITE, CODEBUILD) and includes anti-analysis checks (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent, process enumeration via Process32First, strings referencing wireshark and httpdebug, container/daemon detection via /proc/1/cgroup and dockerinit, setsid + ISDAEMON). Any require() of this package on a matching CI host decrypts and executes attacker-controlled code from the shipped blob under the installer's build identity. The package metadata is a thin stub (random-looking name, no author, no repository, description utility library) consistent with a disposable build-system targeting dropper rather than a real library.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which environments are most likely to trigger the malicious behavior?
The loader is gated on CI-related environment variables, including GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, CIRCLECI, JENKINS_URL, BUILDKITE, and CODEBUILD. A package import on a host where one of these variables is present can trigger execution.
What action causes the payload to run?
Requiring the package is sufficient on a matching CI host. Its small JavaScript entry point loads a platform-specific native addon, which reads the bundled cache, stages JavaScript, and executes it with Node.
Which platforms are covered by the included payload?
The package contains native binaries for Windows, macOS, and a N-API-targeted build. The observed execution paths use CreateProcessA on Windows and fork/exec on Linux or macOS.
How can I assess whether a CI runner may have executed it?
Check whether qzi2v-tttf1-testmetest was installed and required by builds running with the listed CI environment variables. Relevant artifacts include staged JavaScript files matching %s.nc%lu.js and, on Linux or macOS, files under /tmp/.%u.