MAL-2026-20310: Malicious code in @kropa/baileys (npm)
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Source: amazon-inspector (3923302c7a14f319107d525ed998ad0fd9f951f7d499649c2e890a4db465a14c) This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that adds two concerning components not present in upstream. lib/Utils/license-guard.js is a heavily obfuscated module (hex-prefixed identifiers, string-array indirection) whose intent is intentionally hidden from reviewers. lib/Socket/messages-send.js at lines 425 and 436 reconstructs an outbound HTTPS URL from a String.fromCharCode numeric array; decoding the character codes yields the host https://fiora.nixel.my.id/. The destination is assembled via char-code obfuscation rather than appearing as a plain string, so it will not surface in trivial source review, and the host is unrelated to any WhatsApp/Baileys infrastructure. The call sits inside the message-send path, meaning normal use of the library's advertised API (sending WhatsApp messages) triggers traffic to this third-party endpoint controlled by the fork's author. The combination of obfuscated identifier-guard code plus a char-code-hidden non-first-party destination on the message pipeline is the fingerprint of covert data relay / credential or message interception layered on top of a legitimate library.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What activity triggers the suspicious outbound request?
Sending WhatsApp messages through the library's advertised message-send API triggers traffic to the third-party HTTPS endpoint. No separate attacker interaction is described as necessary.
Which deployments are realistically exposed?
Applications that use npm/@kropa/baileys to send WhatsApp messages are exposed, because the suspicious call is located in the message-send path. The described endpoint is https://fiora.nixel.my.id/.
How can I check whether this code is present in a deployed dependency?
Inspect the installed package for lib/Utils/license-guard.js and lib/Socket/messages-send.js. In messages-send.js, check the code around lines 425 and 436 for a String.fromCharCode numeric array that reconstructs the fiora.nixel.my.id URL.
What network evidence could indicate prior exposure?
Review outbound HTTPS and DNS telemetry for connections or lookups to fiora.nixel.my.id from systems running applications that use this package. The data identifies this host as being contacted during message sending.