OESA-2026-4946: grub2 security update
GNU GRUB is a Multiboot boot loader. It was derived from GRUB, the GRand Unified Bootloader, which was originally designed and implemented by Erich Stefan Boleyn. Security Fix(es):
A local attacker with control over GRUB's configuration can bypass lockdown restrictions when booting with Secure Boot and load an unsigned GRUB module, while GRUB continues to report lockdown is enabled.
The vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation of the MMIO base address passed to the GRUB serial command. GRUB does not validate that the base address corresponds to a UART device, rather than being an arbitrary memory address. This allows an attacker to trick GRUB into writing non-arbitrary data at an attacker-controlled address, including resetting the grubfileverifiers list in a way that disables the subsequent verification of loaded modules.(CVE-2026-97876)
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
openeuler/grub2to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.12-58.oe2403sp3
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is realistically exposed to this issue?
Systems running openEuler grub2 are exposed when an attacker has local access and control over GRUB configuration. The affected boot path also involves Secure Boot with GRUB lockdown restrictions in use.
What does an attacker need to exploit it?
The attacker needs local privileges sufficient to control GRUB's configuration. Exploitation relies on supplying a crafted MMIO base address through GRUB's serial command so GRUB writes to an attacker-controlled memory address.
What is the security impact if exploitation succeeds?
An attacker can bypass GRUB lockdown restrictions and load an unsigned GRUB module while GRUB still reports that lockdown is enabled. This is achieved by disabling subsequent module-verification checks through manipulation of the grub_file_verifiers list.