REDHAT-BUG-2489971: Input Validation
Description
The foreman-tail utility in Red Hat Satellite is vulnerable to OS command injection due to the unsafe use of the eval command. The script takes user-supplied arguments and incorporates them directly into a string that is then executed by eval to expand file paths. Because the input is not sanitized or quoted, a local attacker can inject shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &, |) to execute arbitrary system commands.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows a local attacker to escape restricted shells and execute arbitrary commands on the Satellite server. Consequently, the attacker could access sensitive information that could lead to remote code execution (RCE) and lateral movement across the managed infrastructure.
Recommendations
Refactor the script: Remove the use of eval. Use native shell array expansion or find to locate the necessary log files safely.
Input Validation: Implement a strict allow-list to ensure only valid service names are processed.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Compensating control
Implement strict allow-list input validation so that only valid service names are processed.
- Compensating control
Refactor the foreman-tail script to remove use of eval and use native shell array expansion or find to locate log files safely.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit this issue?
A local attacker on a Red Hat Satellite server can exploit it by supplying crafted arguments to the foreman-tail utility. The issue is especially relevant where restricted shells are available, because exploitation can escape those restrictions.
What does successful exploitation allow?
Successful exploitation permits arbitrary system command execution on the Satellite server. This can expose sensitive information and may enable remote code execution and lateral movement across managed infrastructure.
What input is used for command injection?
The foreman-tail script incorporates user-supplied arguments into a string executed through eval while expanding file paths. Shell metacharacters such as ;, &, and | can be injected because the input is not sanitized or quoted.
What mitigation is recommended if the utility must be maintained or modified?
Remove eval and use safe native shell array expansion or find to locate log files. Enforce a strict allow-list so that only valid service names are accepted.