REDHAT-BUG-2507528: High severity maven/io.submariner/submariner-operator vulnerability
GetImagePath returns imageOverrides[component] verbatim with zero validation — no registry allow-list, no digest requirement, no signature check. The resulting image runs with Privileged: true, Capabilities: ALL, hostNetwork, RW hostPath mounts, on every node (route-agent) including control-plane nodes. A cluster-admin or anyone who can patch the Submariner CR can point any component to a malicious image and achieve privileged code execution across the entire cluster.
Source: Project Glasswing AI-SAST audit of submariner-io/submariner-operator. Finding ID: FIND-006 Assurance: machineverified
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Configuration
Implement validation for GetImagePath so imageOverrides[component] cannot be used verbatim: require an approved registry allow-list and a digest requirement (and signature verification if available) before setting the resulting component image.
Submariner (Submariner CR imageOverrides / GetImagePath) imageOverrides[component] validation = validated only - Configuration
Reduce the privileges of the resulting image wherever feasible: avoid Privileged: true, remove broad Capabilities: ALL, and avoid hostNetwork and RW hostPath mounts on every node (including control-plane nodes) for the route-agent.
Submariner route-agent (component image execution) pod security context = least-privilege - Compensating control
Restrict who can patch Submariner CRs to cluster-admin (and other highly trusted roles only), and enforce RBAC so that untrusted users cannot modify imageOverrides[component].
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit this issue?
A cluster administrator, or any principal able to patch the Submariner custom resource, can set a component image override to a malicious image.
What level of access could a successful exploit provide?
The malicious image can run with privileged mode, all capabilities, host networking, and read-write hostPath mounts. Route-agent runs on every node, including control-plane nodes, so exploitation can provide privileged code execution across the cluster.
Are image overrides subject to registry, digest, or signature validation?
No. The image override is returned verbatim, with no registry allow-list, digest requirement, or signature check.