REDHAT-BUG-2523431: SSRF

Published Aug 25, 2026
·
Updated

galaxyng is a Pulp plugin powering Ansible Galaxy and Ansible Automation Platform Private Automation Hub. A server-side request forgery (SSRF) exists in the namespace avatar download path.

In galaxyng/app/api/v3/serializers/namespace.py, avatarurl is a DRF URLField. That field validates URL syntax and scheme (http/https) only. It does not resolve the hostname or filter private, loopback, link-local, or cloud-metadata addresses. On namespace create, downloadlogo is always True. On update, downloadlogo is True whenever avatarurl is present. The serializer then dispatches a Pulp task that calls downloadavatar() in galaxyng/app/tasks/namespaces.py.

downloadavatar() builds an aiohttp session with ClientTimeout(total=None, sockconnect=600, sockread=600) and passes the user-supplied URL to pulpcore HttpDownloader with no address restriction and no redirect-target revalidation. The Pulp worker therefore requests whatever address the publisher supplied, including RFC1918, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, and cloud metadata endpoints.

The SSRF is blind: the response is stored only if it passes image validation (PIL ImageField or SVG). Non-image bodies are discarded, so this is not direct credential exfiltration. The attacker still gets a binary oracle via namespace avatarsha256 (updated vs unchanged), which is enough to enumerate reachable internal IPs and ports from the worker's network. The total=None timeout also lets a slow or hanging target pin a worker, which is a denial-of-service angle.

Privilege required is an authenticated user with galaxy.changenamespace or galaxy.addnamespace. In community Galaxy that includes a user's own namespace.

Affected: galaxyng (verified on current main, HEAD 2bc7189 at clone time). No upstream fix identified in the examined tree. Reporter: Arpit Jain (GitHub arpitjain099), independent security researcher. PSIRT ticket: PSIRTSUPT-22101 Distinct from GHSA-hc3x-6pf5-pmj3 (legacy role import path).

Affected Software

1 affected component
galaxy_ng

Event History

Aug 25, 2026
Data Sourced
via Red Hat·01:42 PM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who can trigger the outbound request?

A publisher who can supply an avatar_url while creating or updating a namespace can cause a Pulp worker to request that URL. The request can target private, loopback, link-local, and cloud-metadata address ranges.

2

Are namespace creation and updates both affected?

Yes. Namespace creation always enables avatar downloading, and an update enables it whenever avatar_url is present.

3

Can this be used to read arbitrary internal service responses?

The SSRF is blind. Responses are retained only when they pass image validation as an image or SVG; non-image response bodies are discarded.

4

Do redirects receive the same destination checks as the original URL?

No. The download path has no address restriction and does not revalidate redirect targets, so a supplied URL can redirect the worker to another address.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203