REDHAT-BUG-2527220: Medium severity Ansible Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller vulnerability
A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller notification subsystem. CustomEmailBackend (awx/main/notifications/emailbackend.py:24) is a thin subclass of django.core.mail.backends.smtp.EmailBackend and does not override open()/sendmessages() to validate its connect target, so the user-controlled notificationconfiguration.host and .port reach smtplib.SMTP(host, port, timeout=...) with no allow-list and no private/loopback/ link-local/reserved rejection. An organization-scoped Notification Admin (awx.notificationadminrole, checked by NotificationTemplateAccess.canadd/canchange at awx/main/access.py:2578/2582 — a delegatable, non-superuser role) can create or PATCH an email notification template with host/port pointing at any internal address and POST the template's /test/ endpoint. The dispatcher runs the backend on the controller-task pod, which opens a raw TCP connection to the attacker-chosen host:port. The smtplib exception string is persisted verbatim into Notification.error (a plain TextField, awx/main/models/notifications.py:219) and is readable over the API, producing a three-state oracle: "[Errno 111] Connection refused" (closed), "timed out" (filtered), and "Connection unexpectedly closed: timed out" or an SMTPResponseException (open). Because the transport is a raw socket, the flaw reaches non-HTTP internal services (for example Redis, PostgreSQL, receptor) and the in-cluster Kubernetes API, and can send SMTP-protocol bytes into those listeners. In addition, the SMTP AUTH exchange transmits the template's stored, otherwise write-only password to the configured host, so a user who can change the host on a shared organization template can exfiltrate its stored SMTP password. The HTTP-based notification backends (webhook, grafana, mattermost, rocketchat) were hardened against this on the 2.7 branch via awx/main/notifications/urlvalidation.py::validateurl(); the email backend (and the IRC backend) were omitted from that hardening. That guard is present only on the 2.7 branch; on the 2.5, 2.6, and development branches it is absent and no notification backend validates its connect target.
Upstream: https://github.com/ansible/tower (awx) Affected file: awx/main/notifications/emailbackend.py:24 (CustomEmailBackend, no host validation); awx/main/models/notifications.py:219 (Notification.error oracle sink); awx/main/access.py:2559-2582 (notificationadminrole). Guard (2.7 only): awx/main/notifications/urlvalidation.py::validateurl (added by tower #7875).
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can trigger connections to internal services?
An organization-scoped Notification Admin can do so. This is a delegatable, non-superuser role checked when creating or changing notification templates.
What access and actions are required to exploit the issue?
The attacker needs the ability to create or PATCH an email notification template, set its host and port to a chosen address, and call the template's test endpoint. The controller-task pod then attempts a raw TCP connection to that host and port.
What information can the attacker obtain from a test request?
The SMTP exception text is stored verbatim in the Notification.error field and can be read through the API. This provides a connection-state oracle, including distinct results such as connection refused, timeout, and successful connection behavior.
How can administrators look for potential abuse?
Review email notification templates created or modified by Notification Admins for unexpected hostnames, internal addresses, or unusual ports. Review notification error values exposed through the API, since connection errors from template tests are persisted in Notification.error.