REDHAT-BUG-2535609: High severity CoreDNS CoreDNS vulnerability
CoreDNS is a DNS server written in Go. Prior to 1.14.7, the DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-HTTP/3, DNS-over-QUIC, and DNS-over-gRPC request paths in plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go, core/dnsserver/serverquic.go, and core/dnsserver/servergrpc.go call dns.Msg.Unpack on attacker-controlled DNS section counts before dns.DefaultMsgAcceptFunc validates the fixed header. An unauthenticated client can use DNS name compression and excessive section counts to amplify allocation before the plugin chain, so plugin-level rate limiting cannot prevent concurrent requests from exhausting memory and terminating CoreDNS. The ordinary UDP and TCP listeners are not affected because they validate the header first. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.7.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
CoreDNSto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.14.7
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which CoreDNS deployments are exposed to this issue?
Deployments using DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-HTTP/3, DNS-over-QUIC, or DNS-over-gRPC request paths are exposed in versions before 1.14.7. Ordinary UDP and TCP listeners are not affected.
Does exploitation require authentication or access to the plugin chain?
No. An unauthenticated client can send crafted DNS requests to the affected listener types. The allocation amplification occurs before the plugin chain is reached.
Will plugin-level rate limiting prevent this denial of service?
No. Plugin-level rate limiting cannot prevent the concurrent memory allocations because request processing reaches the vulnerable unpacking path before the plugin chain.
What is the impact of a successful attack?
An attacker can use DNS name compression and excessive DNS section counts to amplify memory allocation. Concurrent requests can exhaust memory and terminate CoreDNS.
What remediation is available?
Upgrade CoreDNS to version 1.14.7. If an immediate upgrade is not possible, the provided information identifies ordinary UDP and TCP listeners as unaffected, while the affected encrypted or gRPC-based listener paths should be treated as exposed.