REDHAT-BUG-2536955: Input Validation

HTTP/1 authority-form CONNECT is translated to malformed HTTP/2 CONNECT with Host-controlled :authority

A public GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-45h4-vhwh-fmhg) describes the following issue:

Summary

Netty's HTTP/1-to-HTTP/2 conversion does not special-case true HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets. Instead, HttpConversionUtil.toHttp2Headers() applies the generic request conversion path to a request-target like trusted.example:443.

For example:

text CONNECT trusted.example:443 HTTP/1.1 Host: attacker.example:443

is converted to HTTP/2 headers with these security-relevant properties:

text :method: CONNECT :authority: attacker.example:443 :scheme: trusted.example :path: <present>

The exact :path value has varied across releases (/ in checked older 4.2.x releases and trusted.example:443 in current/4.2.15), but the invariant bug is stable: the CONNECT tunnel authority is taken from the HTTP/1 Host header instead of the CONNECT authority-form request-target, and Netty emits HTTP/2 CONNECT-forbidden :scheme and :path pseudo-headers.

HTTP/2 CONNECT must omit :scheme and :path, and :authority must contain the host and port from the CONNECT authority-form request-target. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/2 proxy or gateway, policy that authorizes the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target can disagree with the upstream HTTP/2 proxy, which receives the Host-controlled :authority.

Technical Details

The relevant code is codec-http2/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http2/HttpConversionUtil.java. toHttp2Headers(HttpMessage, boolean) handles HttpRequest conversion with a generic URI/request-target parser:

text String host = inHeaders.getAsString(HttpHeaderNames.HOST); ... String requestTarget = request.uri(); out.path(toHttp2Path(requestTarget)); ... setHttp2Scheme(...); setHttp2Authority(host, out); out.method(request.method().asciiName());

For CONNECT, the HTTP/1 request-target is authority-form (host:port), not an origin-form path and not an absolute URI. On the current branch, trusted.example:443 is treated as a scheme-like string for :scheme, the request-target is emitted as :path, and the HTTP/1 Host header is used for :authority. On checked older 4.2.x releases, the :path value is /, but the authority confusion and forbidden pseudo-header emission still reproduce.

Impact

In a Netty HTTP/1-to-HTTP/2 proxy/gateway path, a remote HTTP/1 client can ask to CONNECT to one authority while supplying a different Host header. Netty then builds an HTTP/2 CONNECT request whose tunnel :authority is Host-controlled and whose pseudo-header set is malformed.

This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, audit logic, or other security controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/2.

This report does not claim code execution or memory corruption. The impact is integrity loss through CONNECT tunnel-target confusion at an HTTP/1-to-HTTP/2 conversion boundary.

Suggested Fix

When converting true HTTP/1 authority-form CONNECT to HTTP/2:

- set :method to CONNECT; - set :authority from the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target authority-form; - omit :scheme and :path; - reject or ignore conflicting Host instead of allowing it to replace the CONNECT target; - add regression tests for direct toHttp2Headers(...) and outbound HttpToHttp2ConnectionHandler conversion.

The attached patched-control diff demonstrates the minimal behavior change:

evidence/minimal-connect-patched-control.diff

The patched-control run passed:

fish ./mvnw -q -pl codec-http2 \ -Dtest=Http2ConnectAuthorityFormFixedControlTest,HttpToHttp2ConnectionHandlerTest#testAuthorityFormRequestTargetHandled \ -Dsurefire.failIfNoSpecifiedTests=false \ -DskipNativeTests -DskipAutobahnTests -Dmaven.antrun.skip=true test

Affected Package/Versions

io.netty:netty-codec-http2

Confirmed affected:

- current 4.2 branch at 7bae566a93e69409697fe57fa807910ba5c9720e - 4.2.15.Final at a41f7b289ce1d697c50846f3ade3983e22b2ed40 - 4.2.2.Final at 660edeaefad4a4cedbd61584e8f668ad2d89f0b8 - 4.2.0.Final at 09e64d259c99be8b5b2a471a78f11e65eb82598a - 4.1.135.Final at f05f765d81460799c53123a207f665bf3b465171

Suggested affected ranges:

- >= 4.1.0.Final, <= 4.1.135.Final - >= 4.2.0.Final, <= 4.2.15.Final

References

- Netty security policy: https://github.com/netty/netty/security/policy - RFC 9113 HTTP/2 CONNECT method: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9113#section-8.5 - RFC 9112 authority-form: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#section-3.2.3 - RFC 9110 CONNECT method: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9110#section-9.3.6

CWE and CVSS

Suggested CWEs:

- CWE-20: Improper Input Validation - CWE-436: Interpretation Conflict - CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests

Suggested CVSS v3.1:

text CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Suggested severity: High, score 7.5.

Rationale: a network peer can trigger this in a proxy/gateway path without authentication. Integrity impact is high because CONNECT can establish a tunnel to an unintended upstream authority when forwarding policy validated a different request-target.

Duplicate Boundary

Nearby reports are distinct:

- GHSA-cg2g-fxr4-mg8m: HTTP/1 absolute-form Host mismatch to HTTP/2 :authority. - GHSA-jgph-cgq3-c627: the sibling HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form conversion bug in netty-codec-http3. - GHSA-w6j8-x45j-w75f: HTTP/2/HTTP/3 Extended CONNECT inbound downgrade. - GHSA-gcjj-c5ff-2m72, GHSA-xf5f-3m33-p8m3, and GHSA-w424-c27v-r9mr: HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1 inbound downgrade families.

This report covers outbound HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form conversion to HTTP/2.

Live duplicate evidence is in evidence/advisory-duplicate-check.tsv.

Local PoV

PoV file:

pov/Http2ConnectAuthorityFormHostConfusionPovTest.java

Run from a Netty checkout after copying the PoV file into codec-http2/src/test/java/io/

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Affected: - maven:io.netty:netty-codec-http2 affected >= 4.1.0.Final, <= 4.1.137.Final; fixed unknown - maven:io.netty:netty-codec-http2 affected >= 4.2.0.Final, <= 4.2.17.Final; fixed unknown

Fixed versions: see advisory

Advisory: https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-45h4-vhwh-fmhg