REDHAT-BUG-2547437: Medium severity Foreman Foreman vulnerability
The API loads a filter by id without the caller's search limit. The lookup is Api::V2::FiltersController#resourcescope, which returns every filter. The action check only asks whether the caller has the delete permission at all. Nothing checks that specific filter on delete. A filter on a locked built-in role is still rejected.
The caller must be logged in and must hold a permission to delete filters that is limited by a search, for example to one role.
Deletion of a filter on another unlocked role was demonstrated through the API. The same delete through the web interface was refused. An update that moves a filter onto a role inside the caller's search was read from the code and was not demonstrated.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What access does an attacker need to exploit this?
The attacker must be authenticated and have permission to delete filters, but that permission must be constrained by a search limit, such as a limit to filters associated with one role.
Which filters can be deleted outside the caller's intended search scope?
A caller can delete a filter associated with another unlocked role despite their delete permission being limited by search scope. Filters on locked built-in roles remain rejected.
Is the issue exploitable through the web interface?
The demonstrated unauthorized deletion was performed through the API. The equivalent deletion attempt through the web interface was refused.