REDHAT-BUG-2574391: Medium severity Ansible ansible-core vulnerability

Published Nov 17, 2026
·
Updated

A flaw was found in ansible-core. When installing a collection with ansible-galaxy collection install, the install destination directory is derived from the namespace and name fields declared inside the collection artifact's own metadata (MANIFEST.json's collectioninfo, or galaxy.yml for directory- or git-sourced installs), without validating that these values are well-formed collection identifiers or confirming that the resulting path stays within the configured collections directory. A specially crafted collection artifact can set an absolute-path or traversal-style name value that redirects the install destination outside the collections path. Before extracting the artifact's contents, ansible-galaxy removes any pre-existing directory at the computed destination and then writes the artifact's files there. An attacker able to get a user or an automated process to run ansible-galaxy collection install against a malicious artifact -- supplied as a local file, a remote URL, a source directory, a git repository, or referenced as a dependency -- can cause deletion of an existing directory writable by the invoking user and creation of attacker-controlled files at that same location, outside the collections directory. Collection signature verification is optional and does not prevent this issue.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Ansible ansible-core

Event History

Nov 17, 2026
Data Sourced
via Red Hat·02:29 PM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which collection installation sources can trigger the issue?

The malicious collection can be supplied as a local file, remote URL, source directory, git repository, or dependency. The source type does not prevent the affected path calculation.

2

What access does an attacker need to cause impact?

An attacker must persuade a user or automated process to run ansible-galaxy collection install against a crafted collection artifact. The affected process must be able to write to the directory selected by the crafted destination path.

3

What happens to an existing directory at the crafted destination?

Before extraction, ansible-galaxy removes any pre-existing directory at the computed destination. It then writes files from the collection artifact to that location, allowing attacker-controlled files to be created there.

Contact

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