REDHAT-BUG-2575741: Medium severity lldpd lldpd vulnerability
A flaw was found in lldpd's liblldpctl. The daemon stores an LLDP-MED location from a neighbor without checking that the body matches the length the location claims. The civic-address CA-element iterator uses that length byte and can read past the end of the buffer. The coordinate getters read a coordinate location that is shorter than 16 bytes the same way. The first civic over-read is in the iterator value function. lldpcli calls the iterator only after the integer location-format getter, and that getter already rejects both bad lengths, so lldpcli does not reach the over-read. A client that walks civic elements or reads coordinate fields without that integer check can disclose adjacent heap bytes from the client process. The fix is upstream commit f39254f, released in lldpd 1.0.23.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
lldpdto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.0.23Patch f39254f
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which applications are exposed to this issue?
Clients using liblldpctl are exposed if they walk civic-address elements or read coordinate fields without first calling the integer location-format getter. The lldpcli client does perform that check and does not reach the over-read path.
What must an attacker provide to trigger the information disclosure?
The attacker must cause the daemon to store an LLDP-MED location received from a neighbor with an invalid claimed length: a civic-address element length that exceeds its body, or a coordinate location shorter than 16 bytes. A vulnerable client can then read adjacent heap data from its own process.
What can be done before updating?
Ensure liblldpctl consumers call the integer location-format getter before iterating civic-address elements or reading coordinate fields, because that getter rejects both invalid length conditions. The upstream fix is commit f39254f, released in lldpd 1.0.23.